Articles
Filter
Post List
The Federal Bureau of Prisons: Willfully Ignorant or Maliciously Unlawful?
The Federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") and the larger U.S. government either purposely ignore the plight of men with serious mental illness in the federal prison system or maliciously act in violation of the law. I have no way of knowing which it is. In a complex system comprising many individual actors, motivations are most likely complex and contradictory. Either way, uncontrovertibly, the BOP and the U.S. government, against overwhelming evidence to the contrary, continuously assert that there are no men with serious mental illnesses housed in the federal supermax prison, the Administrative Maximum facility in Florence, Colorado, also known as ADX. Men and women with serious mental illnesses may not be constitutionally assigned to supermax confinement. Even BOP's own policies forbid the placement of anyone with a serious mental illness in the ADX. The government claims no one with a serious mental illness is in the ADX. Nonetheless, the place is full of men who by any definition have serious mental illnesses. Any thorough review of the 433 men at the ADX would demonstrate that about one-third of the men suffer a severe mental illness. The prison is filled with men who have been previously found unfit to stand trial, men who have long-standing histories of intensive psychiatric treatment, men who take antipsychotic medication, men who decorate their cells with their own feces, and men who mutilate their own bodies. After an investigation, the Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs and the law firm Arnold & Porter, LLP filed suit on behalf of several individuals and a putative class. The U.S. Department of Justice defends the status quo at the ADX and has moved to dismiss the entire lawsuit for failure to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment. As of this writing, it shows no intention of addressing the systemic failures that have led to so many men with serious mental illnesses being placed at the ADX.The Right to Counsel for Indians Accused of Crime: A Tribal and Congressional Imperative
Native American Indians charged in tribal court criminal proceedings are not entitled to court appointed defense counsel. Under well-settled principles of tribal sovereignty, Indian tribes are not bound by Fifth Amendment due process guarantees or Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Instead, they are bound by the procedural protections established by Congress in the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968. Under the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), Indian defendants have the right to counsel at their own expense. This Article excavates the historical background of the lack of counsel in the tribal court arena and exposes the myriad problems that it presents for Indians and tribal sovereignty. While an Indian has the right to defense counsel in federal criminal court proceedings, he does not in tribal court. This distinction makes a grave difference for access to justice for Americans Indians not only in tribal court, but also in state and federal courts. The Article provides in-depth analysis, background, and context necessary to understand the right to counsel under the ICRA and the U.S. Constitution. Addressing serious civil rights violations that negatively impact individual Indians and a tribe's right to formulate due process, this Article ultimately supports an unqualified right to defense counsel in tribal courts. Defense counsel is an indispensable element of the adversary system without which justice would not "still be done." Tribes, however, were forced to embrace a splintered system of justice that required the adversary system but prohibited an adequate defense. The legacy of colonialism and the imposition of this fractured adversary system has had a devastating impact on the formation of tribal courts. This legacy requires tribal and congressional leaders to rethink the issue of defense counsel to ensure justice and fairness in tribal courts today. The Article concludes that tribes should endeavor to provide counsel to all indigent defendants appearing in tribal courts and calls upon Congress to fund the provision of counsel to reverse the legacy of colonialism and avoid serious human rights abuses.Federal Constraints on States’ Ability to License an Undocumented Immigrant to Practice Law
No court has decided whether an undocumented immigrant can be admitted to a state bar in a manner consistent with federal law. At the time of this writing, the issue is pending before the California Supreme Court. Federal law prohibits states from providing public benefits to undocumented immigrants. In its definition of a “public benefit,” 8 U.S.C. § 1621 includes any professional license “provided by an agency of a State . . . or by appropriated funds of a State . . . .” The law’s prohibitions, however, are not unqualified. The statute’s “savings clause” allows states to provide public benefits to immigrants unlawfully present through an affirmative enactment of state law. Current scholarship surrounding this issue has primarily focused on public policy implications. This Note sets out to answer the question of whether 8 U.S.C. § 1621 generally precludes states from issuing law licenses to undocumented immigrants, and if so, how a state may circumvent that prohibition. First, this Note addresses the threshold question of whether a law license is a public benefit under the federal statute. Contrary to the argument put forward by the Committee of Bar Examiners of the State Bar of California, I argue that the most straightforward reading of the statute includes law licenses within the category of prohibited public benefits. Second, this Note explores how a state could use the statute’s savings clause to provide law licenses to undocumented immigrants. By requiring an affirmative enactment of state law, Congress likely had in mind legislative enactments. I argue, however, that in the realm of bar admission where state supreme courts have plenary power to set requirements, a court rule allowing for eligibility of undocumented immigrants should be sufficient to trigger the statute’s savings clause.Race, Markets, and Hollywood’s Perpetual Antitrust Dilemma
This Article focuses on the oft-neglected intersection of racially skewed outcomes and anti-competitive markets. Through historical, contextual, and empirical analysis, the Article describes the state of Hollywood motion-picture distribution from its anticompetitive beginnings through the industry's role in creating an anti-competitive, racially divided market at the end of the last century. The Article's evidence suggests that race-based inefficiencies have plagued the film distribution process and such inefficiencies might likely be caused by the anti-competitive structure of the market itself, and not merely by overt or intentional racial-discrimination. After explaining why traditional anti-discrimination laws are ineffective remedies for such inefficiencies, the Article asks whether antitrust remedies and market mechanisms mght provide more robust solutions.Cascading Constitutional Deprivation: The Right to Appointed Counsel for Mandatorily Detained Immigrants Pending Removal Proceedings
Today, an immigrant green card holder mandatorily detained pending his removal proceedings, without bail and without counsel, due to a minor crime committed perhaps long ago, faces a dire fate. If he contests his case, he may remain incarcerated in substandard conditions for months or years. While incarcerated, he will likely be unable to acquire a lawyer, access family who might assist him, obtain key evidence, or contact witnesses. In these circumstances, he will nearly inevitably lose his deportation case and be banished abroad from work, family, and friends. The immigrant's one chance to escape these cascading events is the off-the-record Joseph hearing challenging detention. If he wins the hearing and is released, he can then secure counsel, and if so, will likely win his case. Yet detained and most likely pro se, he may not even know a Joseph hearing exists, let alone win it, given the complex statutory analysis involved, regarding facts, witnesses, and evidence outside his reach. The immigration detention system today is unique in modern American law, in providing for preventive pretrial detention without counsel pursuant to underlying proceedings without counsel - let alone proceedings so complex that result in a deprivation of liberty as severe as deportation. In this Article, I call this the cascading constitutional deprivation of wrongful detention and deportation. I argue, under modern procedural due process theories, that this cascading constitutional deprivation warrants appointed counsel, notwithstanding traditional plenary power over immigration laws. In a post-Padilla v. Kentucky world where criminal defenders must now advise their clients on the same issues litigated at the Joseph hearing, I argue a right to appointed counsel for mandatorily detained immigrants pending removal proceedings is constitutionally viable and practically feasible.To Plea or Not to Plea: Retroactive Availability of Padilla v. Kentucky to Noncitizen Defendants on State Postconviction Review
The United States incarcerates hundreds of thousands of noncitizen criminal defendants each year. In 2010, there were about 55,000 "criminal aliens" in federal prisons, accounting for approximately 25 percent of all federal prisoners. In 2009, there were about 296,000 noncitizens in state and local jails. Like Jose, these defendants usually do not know that their convictions may make them automatically deportable under the INA. Under the Supreme Court's recent ruling in Padilla v. Kentucky, criminal defense attorneys have an affirmative duty to give specific, accurate advice to noncitizen clients regarding the deportation risk of potential pleas. This rule helps assure that, going forward, noncitizens will be in a position to make informed plea decisions. Knowing the potential consequences of a conviction, they may choose to go to trial, risking a longer sentence but possibly avoiding conviction and subsequent deportation. Unfortunately, for some noncitizen defendants, Padilla was decided too late; at the time Padilla was announced, they had already pleaded guilty, relying upon the advice of defense counsel who failed to advise them of the potential immigration consequences of their conviction. Under what circumstances should relief be available to such noncitizen defendants? This Note argues that courts should apply the rule of Padilla v. Kentucky retroactively on state postconviction review to at least the limited group of defendants whose cases were on direct review when Padilla was decided.A Failure of the Fourth Amendment & Equal Protection’s Promise: How the Equal Protection Clause Can Change Discriminatory Stop and Frisk Policies
Terry v. Ohio changed everything. Before Terry, Fourth Amendment law was settled. The Fourth Amendment had long required that police officers have probable cause in order to conduct Fourth Amendment invasions; to administer a "reasonable" search and seizure, the state needed probable cause. But in 1968, the Warren Court, despite its liberal reputation, lowered the standard police officers had to meet to conduct a certain type of search: the so-called "'stop' and 'frisk.'" A "stop and frisk" occurs when a police officer, believing a suspect is armed and crime is afoot, stops the suspect, conducts an interrogation, and pats him down for weapons. In Terry, the Supreme Court detached reasonableness from probable cause for such "limited" searches and seizures; if a police officer's suspicions, based on articulable facts, lead her to believe that crime is afoot and that a perpetrator is armed, then under the Fourth Amendment, a search for weapons is constitutionally permissible. Despite reversing precedent, Terry and its Supreme Court progeny allowed police officers to rely upon their reasonable suspicions to conduct searches only under narrow conditions. Lower courts, however, have enlarged Terry beyond recognition. Indeed, police officers now have wide latitude to stop and frisk suspects. From the New York stop and frisk numbers flows the class-action Floyd v. City of New York. In Floyd, minority plaintiffs contend that the city's stop and frisk practices unconstitutionally infringe upon personal liberty. The Fourth Amendment as currently interpreted, however, permits cities like New York to promulgate stop and frisk practices that result in racial harassment. What constitutional tool, then, can compel local governments and police departments to revamp their discriminatory stop and frisk techniques? The answer must be the Equal Protection Clause.Have a Job to Get a Job: Disparate Treatment and Disparate Impact of the ‘Currently Employed’ Requirement
Countless people struggle to find a job in a competitive job market despite possessing solid qualifications. Although the news media reports that job numbers are improving, the problems of unemployment particularly loom for people of color, older workers, and people with disabilities. These groups are often unemployed longer than other job seekers. These groups also suffer the disparate impact of job advertisements that require "current employment" as a prerequisite for hiring. The harsh reality is that the longer a job seeker is unemployed, the closer a job seeker becomes to becoming permanently unemployed. Job advertisements that require "current employment" exacerbate the problem. However, traditional disparate impact analysis under the civil rights laws can help to address some of the issues faced by these long-term unemployed job seekers.RLUIPA: What’s the Use
After Congress passed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), which protects religious land use, many observers feared that the legislation would allow religious organizations to flout land-use regulations. Because RLUIPA defines "religious exercise" broadly, these observers feared the law would protect an array of nonworship uses, including commercial ventures, as long as a religious entity owned the land. More than a decade after RLUIPA's passage, this Note concludes that courts have not interpreted religious exercise as broadly as those observers feared. Courts have not, however, settled on a clear or consistent way of interpreting religious exercise. This Note reviews the case law and extracts a coherent framework to interpret religious exercise.
