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The Carceral State(s)
The carceral state is everywhere. Legal and social science scholars are increasingly using the carceral state concept to criticize various aspects, or even the entirety, of the United States. But despite how popular and common this term has become in writings about mass incarceration, criminal processes and punishments, and other forms of social control, the definition, conceptualization, and theorization of the carceral state are far from settled. This Article analyzes and contributes to this discussion by highlighting the diversity and fluidity of ideas surrounding the carceral state. Although the term often appears without an express definition, the limited ones that do exist vary in their construction. There are also multiple perspectives on the carceral state’s characteristics, including its composition, relationship with the prison-industrial complex, its age, size, and form. Also, while many prominent scholars agree that its discriminatory actions and effects are defining features of the carceral state, notable differences remain in how this discrimination is framed. This decentralized and varied understanding impacts both the theoretical development and practical applications of the carceral state concept. Rather than converging into a single, cohesive theory, multiple interpretations of the carceral state persist and will likely continue to do so. While this diversity of perspectives offers advantages, it also presents challenges in achieving the necessary consensus to dismantle the carceral state and build a noncarceral one.La Ignorancia Es Atrevida: Hernandez v. New York and the Mistaken Exclusion of Bilingual Jurors
Mere knowledge of [a foreign language] cannot reasonably be regarded as harmful. Heretofore it has been commonly looked upon as helpful or desirable.1Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923). Introduction The majority of…Police Gatekeeping
The role of policing in American society is more pervasive (and less visible) than many acknowledge. Police do not just patrol, arrest, and keep peace – they also gatekeep. Many and varied ostensibly non-criminal processes rely on police fact-finding to adjudicate claims, establish eligibility for resources, and take adverse action against individuals. This Article examines the phenomenon of police gatekeeping, both as a practical barrier to resources and remedies and as a hegemonic mechanism to construct the social conception of truth. Recognizing the ways in which civil society relies upon police as gatekeepers of both practical resources and the social conception of truth is a first step toward reducing the role of the carceral state. The influence of police is hidden in the background of our daily lives. Shining a light on this influence – and questioning it – can allow us to rethink our ways of knowing and reimagine structures that promote autonomy, reduce hegemonic state control, and begin to take practical steps toward diminishing the supremacy of the carceral state in American civil society.A Framework for Managing Disputes Over Intellectual Property Rights in Traditional Knowledge
Major controversies in moral and political theory concern the rights, if any, Indigenous peoples should have over their traditional knowledge. Many scholars, including me, have tackled these controversies. This Article addresses a highly important practical issue: Can we come up with a solid framework for resolving disputes over actual or proposed intellectual property rights in traditional knowledge? Yes, we can. The framework suggested here starts with a preliminary distinction between control rights and income rights. It then moves to four categories that help to understand disputes: nature of the traditional knowledge under dispute; dynamics between named parties to disputes; unnamed Indigenous claimants; and the various normative systems (for example, custom, U.N. documents, treaties, statutes, administrative regulations) within which disputes are decided. Throughout, examples that inform the framework come principally from Indigenous peoples in the Pacific rim. Lastly the Article tests the framework against some disputes over traditional knowledge in Samoa and New Zealand. This framework is comprehensive and sensitive to context. It is flexible regarding which normative systems are best suited to settling disputes. A test run shows that the framework helps to resolve practical legal issues.Abolition Economics
Over the past several decades, Law & Economics has established itself as one of the most well-known branches of interdisciplinary legal scholarship. The tools of L&E have been applied to a wide range of legal issues and have even been brought to bear on Critical Race Theory in an attempt to address some of CRT’s perceived shortcomings. This Article seeks to reverse this dynamic of influence by applying CRT and related critical perspectives to the field of economics. We call our approach Abolition Economics. By embracing the abolitionist ethos of “dismantle, change, and build,” we seek to break strict disciplinary habits of modelling and identification, destabilize value systems implicit in mainstream economics, model society more fully as made up of interconnected humans, and develop a richer and more realistic understanding of racialized economic inequality, hierarchy, and oppression. We argue that, contrary to accepted disciplinary conventions, such an endeavor does not introduce new (inappropriate) ideological content into (objective) economics; rather, this endeavor is necessary to fully reveal the ideological content already embedded in mainstream economics as it is currently practiced, and the consequences of that embedding in supporting the functioning of systems of racial capitalism and racial injustice. We believe that imagining the possibility of a different economics—an Abolition Economics—can be an act not only of resistance but, crucially, of freedom-making.Reviving Indian Country: Expanding Alaska Native Villages’ Tribal Land Bases Through Fee-to-Trust Acquisitions
For the last fifty years, the possibility of fee-to-trust acquisitions in Alaska has been precarious at best. This is largely due to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971 (ANCSA), which eschewed the traditional reservation system in favor of corporate land ownership and management. Despite its silence on trust acquisitions, ANCSA was and still is cited as the primary prohibition to trust acquisitions in Alaska. Essentially, ANCSA both reduced Indian Country in Alaska and prohibited any opportunities to create it, leaving Alaska Native Villages without the significant territorial jurisdiction afforded to Lower 48 tribes. However, recent policy changes from the Department of Interior reaffirmed the eligibility of trust acquisitions post-ANCSA and a proposed rule from the Bureau of Indian Affairs signals a favorable presumption of approval for Alaska Native fee-to-trust applications. This Note reviews the history and controversy of trust acquisitions in Alaska, and more importantly, it demonstrates the methods in which Alaska Native Villages may still acquire fee land for trust acquisitions after ANCSA.Revising the Indian Plenary Power Doctrine
undermined Tribal sovereignty. The doctrine’s legal basis remains a constitutional conundrum. This Article considers the Court’s recent engagement with plenary power judicial readiness to reevaluate the doctrine. The Article takes hold of Justice Gorsuch’s critical assessment and runs with it, ultimately proposing a method for cleaning up this destructive…A Theory of Racialized Judicial Decision-Making
In this Article, I introduce a theory of racialized judicial decision-making as a framework to explain how judicial decision-making as a system contributes to creating and maintaining the racial hierarchy in the United States. Judicial decision-making, I argue, is itself a racialized systemic process in which judges transpose racially-bounded cognitive schemas as they make decisions. In the process, they assign legal burdens differentially across ethnoracial groups, to the disproportionate detriment of ethnoracial minorities. After presenting this argument, I turn to three mechanisms at play in racialized judicial decision-making: (1) whiteness as capital that increases epistemic advantages in the judicial process, (2) color-evasive approaches as effective tools to justify racially disparate outcomes, and (3) the elevation of racial discrimination into a status of exceptionalism that justifies heightened standards in proving racial anti-discrimination claims. I argue that the racialized judicial decision-making process reproducing the social racial hierarchy is institutionalized via the legitimacy courts wield. I conclude with a discussion on the agency and autonomy inherent in the judicial decision-making process, emphasizing judicial decision-making is not simply a reflection of ideology—personal or otherwise—individual biases, or cultural tides, and can as a system be leveraged to further racial equity in a democratic society.Teaching Slavery in Commercial Law
Public status shapes private ordering. Personhood status, conferred or acknowledged by the state, determines whether one is a party to or the object of a contract. For much of our nation’s history, the law deemed all persons of African descent to have a limited status, if given personhood at all. The property and partial personhood status of African-Americans, combined with standards developed to facilitate the growth of the international commodities market for products including cotton, contributed to the current beliefs of business investors and even how communities of color are still governed and supported. The impact of that shift in status persists today. The commodities markets and the nations that rose and prospered would not be possible without the slave trade, and that trade would not be possible without the legal, business, and social norms in place to facilitate private ordering and growth while reinforcing the subjugation of African-Americans. Yet, many business and commercial law professors devote class time to teaching foundational and historical material, without any consideration of the impact of slavery. To avoid slavery in business and commercial law courses is to ignore an institution that plays a pivotal role in much of what we do today. Slavery is not a frolic, it is foundational. Many American universities played a role in the slave trade—either by receiving funds from the enterprise or receiving the enslaved as donations and using their labor or disposing of them for the financial advancement of the institution. In my Core Commercial Concepts course, a Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) survey class covering Articles 2, 3, 4, and 9, I devote time and space to discussions of race and the law by making the connection between the history of commercial concepts, slavery, and the role of the cotton industry in the shaping of international commercial law norms. In my simulation, described in this Essay, I teach the story of Washington and Lee University’s sale of individuals for the purpose of ensuring the institution’s financial survival, then extrapolate from the facts to review the high points of commercial law. I incorporate materials on the legacy of slavery at my own institution to provide students with a scenario based on the acquisition of real property and construction of buildings they engage with on campus. In this Essay I explain the methods I use to explore these concepts. Working in a framework that focuses on classification and status, my students consider issues of federalism and the impact of statutory definitions on private ordering, while discussing how these definitions shape the relationship of African-Americans to commerce.Carceral Socialization as Voter Suppression
In an era of mass incarceration, many people are socialized through interactions with the carceral state. These interactions are powerful learning experiences, and by design, they are contrary to democratic citizenship. Citizenship is about belonging to a community of equals, being entitled to mutual respect and concern. Criminal punishment deliberately harms, subordinates, and stigmatizes. Encounters with the carceral system are powerful experiences of anti-democratic socialization, and they impact peoples’ sense of citizenship and trust in government. Accordingly, a large body of social science research shows that eligible voters who have carceral contact are significantly less likely to vote or to participate in politics. Hence, the carceral system’s impact on political participation goes well beyond those who are formally disenfranchised due to convictions. It also suppresses participation among the millions of legally eligible voters who have not been formally disenfranchised—people who have had more fleeting encounters with law enforcement or vicarious interactions with the carceral system. This Article considers the implications of these findings from the perspective of voting rights law and the constitutional values underlying it. In a moment when voting rights are under siege, voting rights advocates are in a heated discussion about how our federal and state constitutions protect ideals of democratic citizenship and political equality. This discussion has largely (and for good reason) focused on how the law should address what I call “de jure” suppression: tangible election laws and policies that impose legal barriers to voting, or dilute voting power. Eliminating these formal barriers to voting is vital. But, I argue, fully realizing the constitutional values underlying voting rights will also require also addressing what I call “de facto” suppression, or suppression through socialization. This occurs not through formal legal restrictions on voting, but when state institutions like the carceral system systematically socialize citizens in a manner that is incompatible with democratic citizenship. I show how de facto suppression threatens the constitutional interests protected by the right to vote just like de jure suppression does. In short, by systematically socializing people in a manner that is fundamentally incompatible with democratic citizenship, the state can effectively strip a citizen of much of the instrumental and intrinsic value conferred by the right to vote. Those who are concerned about advancing and protecting voting rights should understand the carceral system’s anti-democratic socialization as a form of political suppression—one that should warrant constitutional scrutiny for the same reasons that de jure suppression should warrant scrutiny.
