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Ownership Without Citizenship: The Creation of Noncitizen Property Rights
At the nation’s founding, the common law of property defined ownership as an incident of citizenship. Noncitizens were unable lawfully to hold, devise, or inherit property. This doctrine eroded during the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but few scholars have examined its demise or the concommittant rise of property rights for foreigners. This Article is the first sustained treatment of the creation of property rights for noncitizens in American law. It uncovers two key sources for the rights that emerged during the nineteenth century: federal territorial law, which allowed for alien property ownership and alien suffrage, and state constitutions, a significant number of which included property rights for noncitizens. Iowa, Wisconsin, California, and Michigan led the way, including these rights in their state constitutions prior to the Civil War. Through close examination of congressional debates, records of state constitutional conventions, and other historical texts, this Article places this significant legal reform in a broader historical context. Lawmakers succeeded in untethering notions of citizenship from notions of ownership, creating a more expansive vision of membership in the American polity. Property law was itself a form of immigration law, used not to expel migrants but rather to attract them and eventually, lawmakers hoped, to assimilate them as new Americans. The property reforms discussed here did not, however, result in property rights for all noncitizens; in fact, a majority of states today have some form of property restriction based on alienage. This Article suggests that an answer for the persistence of noncitizen property restrictions in American law lies in the nineteenth century. Reform efforts in this era held the seeds of restrictive policies that would develop later in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, such as anti-Asian land laws and anti-illegal immigrant housing ordinances. Sources from the nineteenth century reveal that becoming “American” through property ownership was not a fully inclusive process; from the outset it was limited by assumptions about national origin, race and territorial location.Protecting Intangible Cultural Resources: Alternatives to Intellectual Property Law
Cultural resources can be defined as "the tangible and intangible effects of an individual or group of people that define their existence, and place them temporally and geographically in relation to their belief systems and their familial and political groups, providing meaning to their lives." The field of cultural resources includes tangible items, such as land, sacred sites, and religious and finerary objects. The field also includes intangible knowledge and customs, such as tribal names, symbols, stories, and ecological, ethnopharmacological, religious, or other traditional knowledge. The tangible cultural resources of tribes can fall under the protection of statutes such as the Archeological Resources Protection Act of 1979 and the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 1990 (NAGPRA). The protection of intangible cultural resources, however, is less codified. The provision of legal protection for intangible cultural resources has focused almost entirely on either linking such protection to human rights or defining intangible culture as intellectual property (IP). Early work on defining intangible cultural resources as IP was conducted jointly by UNESCO and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), which led to the Model Provisions for National Laws on the Protection of Expressions of Folklore Against Illicit Exploitation and Other Prejudicial Actions (1985). Work by WIPO continues today through its Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore. This is complemented by a growing body of law, mostly in other countries, using property law to halt cultural appropriation from indigenous communities. However, as it stands, IP law, in general, may be a poor fit for tribes. This Comment explores alternatives that exist in the form of regulation of research and tort actions against researchers who violate these regulations. It is premised on the observation that one of the primary means by which culture has been appropriated from American Indian communities has been through social scientific research. Indians are among the most heavily studied groups in fields like medicine, public health, and, recently, genetics. Yet anthropology, more than any other discipline, has made American Indians the subjects of research.RLUIPA: What’s the Use
After Congress passed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), which protects religious land use, many observers feared that the legislation would allow religious organizations to flout land-use regulations. Because RLUIPA defines "religious exercise" broadly, these observers feared the law would protect an array of nonworship uses, including commercial ventures, as long as a religious entity owned the land. More than a decade after RLUIPA's passage, this Note concludes that courts have not interpreted religious exercise as broadly as those observers feared. Courts have not, however, settled on a clear or consistent way of interpreting religious exercise. This Note reviews the case law and extracts a coherent framework to interpret religious exercise.Towards a Balanced Approach for the Protection of Native American Sacred Sites
Protection of "sacred sites" is very important to Native American religious practitioners because it is intrinsically tied to the survival of their cultures, and therefore to their survival as distinct peoples. The Supreme Court in Oregon v. Smith held that rational basis review, and not strict scrutiny, was the appropriate level of judicial review when evaluating the constitutionality of neutral laws of general applicability even when these laws impacted one's ability to practice a religion. Reacting to the decision, Congress enacted the Relgious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which reinstated the strict scrutiny test for challenges to neutral laws of general applicability alleged to have substantially burdened free exercise rights. In a controversial 2008 decision, the Ninth Circuit held that a "substantial burden" under RFRA is only imposed when individuals are either coerced to act contrary to their religious beliefs or forced to choose between following the tenets of their religion and receiving a governmental benefit. In all likelihood, such a narrow definition of substantial burden will prevent Native American practitioners from successfully invoking RFRA to protect their sacred sites. In this Article, I first explore whether the Ninth Circuit's definition of "substantial burden" is mandated under RFRA. To a large degree, this question comes down to whether a pre-RFRA Supreme Court decision, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery, precludes courts from adopting a broader definition of what is a substantial burden under RFRA. Although this Article contends that neither Lyng nor RFRA precludes the adoption of a broader definition of "substantial burden," the Article nevertheless acknowledges that many judges may disagree. The Article therefore recommends enactment of a legislative solution. The legislation proposed is a compromise between the needs of Indian religious practitioners and those who argue that religious practitioners should not have a veto over how federal lands are used and developed. Therefore, in return for the broadening of what can constitute a substantial burden on free exercise rights, the Article recommends the adoption of an intermediate type of judicial scrutiny. The Article also discusses ways to limit what can be considered sacred sites under the legislation so as to ensure protection of sites vital to Native American culture and religion without unnecessarily burdening federal management of federal lands.Individual Aboriginal Rights
This Article will, in Section I, deal with the legal development of the concept of individual aboriginal rights. It will focus on the Western Shoshone land claims before the Indian Claims Commission, and the federal government's trespass claims against the ranching operations of the redoubtable, irrepressible Dann sisters. Section II will explore the development and utilization of the doctrine of individual aboriginal rights in a series of cases involving the Dann sisters, subsequent Western Shoshone, and other efforts by native people to secure subsistence hunting and fishing rights and possession of or access to sacred sites. Section III will explore some related concepts in western public land law. This Section suggests that custom, prescription, access under nineteenth century self-executing right of way statutes, regulatory efforts, and administrative accommodation have provided at least some protection for the access of tribal peoples to sacred sites. Section IV will speculate about the future expansion of such efforts, and explore the possibility that the growth of colorblind equal protection doctrine will spread into the area of Indian law and threaten what Charles Wilkinson has called the "measured separatism" of tribal sovereignty and property.Abandoning the PIA Standard: A Comment on Gila V
Part I of this Note examines the development of Indian reserved water rights, and the practicably irrigable acreage method of quantifying those rights, as defined by the Court. Part II describes the arguments of state and private interests that oppose broad Indian water rights. Part III discusses Gila V, including the Arizona Supreme Court's rationale for abandoning the standard set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court and the standard for quantifying Indian reserved rights that the court applied in its place. Part IV analyzes the Arizona Supreme Court's justifications for abandoning the standard, and considers alternate grounds for the decision. Ultimately, this Note concludes that the Arizona Supreme Court misinterpreted precedent and wrongfully rejected the standard established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Arizona I and Arizona II. Thus, Gila V should be viewed as an abrogation of the established standard for defining Indian water rights and not serve as precedent.Land and Liberation: Lessons for the Creation of Effective Land Reform Policy in South Africa
Based upon the premise that land reform is essential to creating socio-economic equality, easing racial tensions and stemming the tide of violence in South Africa, this note will provide suggestions for effective land reform policy. To accomplish this, this Note will examine the paths taken by several other transitional African governments in land reform policy. It will attempt to extract practical lessons from their experiences and apply them towards the development of effective land redistribution policy in South Africa. Part I of this note will provide a historical overview of colonialism and land law in Africa. Part II will examine the postcolonial land reform policy in Kenya, Tanzania and Zimbabwe and part III will attempt to extract lessons from the experiences in these countries. Part IV will seek to apply these lessons towards the development of effective land reform policy in South Africa. Finally, Part V will again stress the need for land reform as a means of creating economic equity and racial harmony.Purchasing While Black: How Courts Condone Discrimination in the Marketplace
Given the sweeping language of § 1981 and 1982, it cannot be that sellers of goods can engage in intentional discrimination, so long as they make relatively minor attempts to cover it up. By exploring the interaction between substantive law, procedural law, legal culture, and real-world context, Graves seeks to demonstrate that judges cannot offer any legal or practical justification for heightened pleading requirements in § 1981 and 1982 actions. Through this argument, a conclusion is reached that § 1981 and 1982 plaintiffs must be given the same opportunity to litigate their claims that virtually all other plaintiffs are given. While this conclusion might seem basic, it is currently being ignored in many courtrooms across this country. The overwhelming majority of literature in the field makes the case against heightened pleading requirements by arguing that these requirements violate the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The impropriety of heightened pleading requirements under the Federal Rules, however, is not the final deduction in an argument against heightened pleading requirements; it is a starting point. Once we understand that heightened pleading requirements violate the Rules, we can ask why judges continue to impose them. We can, thus, attack the principles underlying judges' decisions to impose heightened pleading requirements.Chicana/Chicano Land Tenure in the Agrarian Domain: On the Edge of a “Naked Knife”
Neither sovereignty nor property rights could forestall American geopolitical expansion in the first half of the nineteenth century. The conflicts that resulted from this clash of doctrine with desire are perhaps most evident in the history of the Chicanas/Chicanos of Texas, California, and the Southwest, who sought to maintain their land and property, as guaranteed by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, in the aftermath of the U.S.- Mexico War. Integrating an exploration of case law with political and social histories of the period, the Author explores the sociolegal significance of Chicana/Chicano land dispossession; exposes the racial, economic, and political motivations of the legislators, judges, and attorneys involved; and demonstrates the internal incoherence of land grant doctrine. Focusing on the material relationship of the past to the present, the author seeks to establish linkages between the past roles of law and legal structures in dispossessing Chicanas/Chicanos of their land and their present roles in structuring Chicana/Chicano political and economic subordination in the agricultural sector. The author concludes that the study of Mexican land dispossession suggests both the need to expand the traditional approach to teaching property law as well as the importance of deploying the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and international law in the struggle for racial equity.Moving from Colonias to Comunidades: A Proposal for New Mexico to Revisit the Installment Land Contract Debate
Communities of Mexican Americans in the Southwest, known as colonias, have provided many low-income buyers with affordable opportunities. Affordability, however, comes at a high price for the colonias residents. Most of the buyers live in colonias pursuant to installment land contracts, devices which allow buyers to spread the purchase price of property over a number of years but leave them without legal title or equity under New Mexico law. The buyers sacrifice their legal rights to "own" small, unimproved lots of land in developments that are often without electricity, gas, a sewage system, and indoor plumbing. The author argues that New Mexico could allocate rights to buyers under installment land contracts while maintaining the reasonable cost of colonias housing and preserving the communities. She posits several alternatives for the state legislature and judiciary, including the adoption of a statutory definition which treats the contracts as mortgages and a more flexible interpretation of the forfeiture clauses in the contracts pursuant to mortgage and contract law. The Note concludes with suggested outreach strategies to inform colonias residents of their rights under installment land contracts and to provide them with legal assistance to enforce their rights.
