All content tagged with: Policing

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  • Abusing Discretion: The Battle for Childhood in Schools

    For too many children the schoolhouse doors become a point of entry into the criminal justice system. Children of color are the most likely to suffer from this phenomenon. The presence of policing in schools is a key contributor to this “school-to-prison pipeline.” This Note argues that broad, discretionary mandates for school resource officers (SROs) promote biased law enforcement that impacts Black girls in different and specific ways. I contend that SRO mandates can be effectively limited by strategically bolstering community organizing efforts with impact litigation.

  • State Sponsored Radicalization

    Where was the FBI in the months leading up to the violent siege on the U.S. Capitol in 2021? Among the many questions surrounding that historic day, this one reveals the extent to which double standards in law enforcement threaten our nation’s security. For weeks, Donald Trump’s far right-wing supporters had been publicly calling for and planning a protest in Washington, D.C. on January 6, the day Congress was to certify the 2021 presidential election results. Had they been following credible threats to domestic security, officials would have attempted to stop the Proud Boys and QAnon from breaching the Capitol perimeter. Yet when the day came, the mob of pro-Trump extremists seemed to catch law enforcement by surprise. They seized the Capitol, ransacked congress members’ offices, and openly posted photos of their destruction and their weapons online. In the preceding two decades, the U.S. government has poured money into a behemoth national security apparatus. The FBI’s annual budget ballooned from $3 billion in 1999 to nearly $10 billion today. Much of this 300% increase went to countering terrorism with a mandate to surveil, investigate, and prosecute “homegrown terrorists.” In no uncertain terms, the directive was for the FBI to target Muslim communities.

  • Tightening the OODA Loop: Police Militarization, Race, and Algorithmic Surveillance

    This Article examines how military automated surveillance and intelligence systems and techniques, when used by civilian police departments to enhance predictive policing programs, have reinforced racial bias in policing. I will focus on two facets of this problem. First, I investigate the role played by advanced military technologies and methods within civilian police departments. These approaches have enabled a new focus on deterrence and crime prevention by creating a system of structural surveillance where decision support relies increasingly upon algorithms and automated data analysis tools and automates de facto penalization and containment based on race. Second, I will explore these militarized systems, and their effects, from an outside-in perspective, paying particular attention to the racial, societal, economic, and geographic factors that play into the public perception of these new policing regimes. I will conclude by proposing potential solutions to this problem that incorporate tests for racial bias to create an alternative system that follows a true community policing model.

  • Closing the Gap Between What is Lawful and What is Right in Police Use of Force Jurisprudence by Making Police Departments More Democratic Institutions

    On August 9, 2014, Michael Brown was shot to death in Ferguson, Missouri, by police officer Darren Wilson. Members of the Ferguson community rose up in response. Protests demanding that police violence against African Americans cease and that accountability for police misconduct be addressed erupted across the country, and they have not subsided since. Incidents in Baltimore, Maryland; Chicago, Illinois; WallerCounty, Texas; and elsewhere have kept the movement alive. The mass media, the political elite, and the White middle class woke up to a reality that had been long known to communities of color – force is used disproportionately against people of color, and this has caused a breakdown in trust between the police and the communities they serve. There are many causes for this breakdown in trust. Police officers are the faces of a criminal justice system that has dramatically disproportionate negative effects based on race and economic status. Practices like stop-and-frisk and broken windows policing have put people of color in hostile contact with law enforcement on a daily basis. The imposition of excessive fines and court fees in some communities has created severe criminal consequences often for traffic or other minor offenses.

  • Schooling the Police: Race, Disability, and the Conduct of School Resource Officers

    On March 25, 2015, police officers effectuated a violent seizure of a citizen in Kenner, Louisiana: [T]he police grabbed her by the ankles and dragged her away [from the tree]. . . . [She was] lying face down on the ground, handcuffed with her face pressed so closely to the ground that she was having difficulty breathing due to the grass and dirt that was so close to her nose and mouth. An officer was kneeling on top of her, pinning her down with a knee squarely in [her] back. Several other officers, as well as several school administrators, stood around the scene watching. [She] was crying and yelling[,] “Help, I’m hurting.” The handcuffed individual was a Black, ten-year-old child who has been diagnosed with autism. On the day of the incident, she “began acting up in class, running around the classroom, climbing on desks, and knocking down classroom chairs.” After she climbed out of the classroom window and up a tree on school property, school officials called the police. Instead of responding to the situation in a manner appropriate for a fourth grader with autism, officers responded with handcuffs and a knee in her back. In Mississippi, a twelve-year-old diagnosed with bipolar disorder “was handcuffed in front of several classmates and put in the back of a police car outside of [his middle school]” after “los[ing] his temper in an argument with another student, and hit[ing] several teachers when they tried to intervene.” Following the incident, the boy was briefly admitted to a mental health facility, then “charged with three counts of assault.” In Virginia, a Black eleven-year-old boy diagnosed with autism was charged with disorderly conduct and felony assault of a police officer for his acts of kicking over a trash can in school and trying to pull away when a school resource officer grabbed him. Unfortunately, the facts in these elementary school students’ cases are not rare. Over the past few decades, schools across the country have adopted extremely harsh discipline policies to control student misbehavior that may be caused by an underlying disability.

  • Cross-Racial Identifications: Solutions to the “They All Look Alike” Effect

    On a late summer evening in August of 1997, Nathan Brown was in his apartment rocking his young daughter to sleep when the police knocked on his door. The police sought Brown, one of a few Black men in his apartment complex, after a young White woman said she had been assaulted by a shirtless Black man wearing black shorts with strong body odor walking through the complex’s courtyard. Minutes later the police took Brown outside and put him in the patrol car for a one-on-one “showup.” They brought him out by himself to see the victim wearing black shorts without a shirt, and she quickly identified him as her attacker, even though he lacked a strong body odor. The victim explained later that she believed he had showered right after the attack, meaning he was her attacker. The victim again identified Brown as her attacker at trial. Though Brown took the stand in his own defense and testified that he was home at the time of the attack caring for his “fussy infant daughter”—an alibi corroborated by four of his family members—he was convicted of attempted aggravated rape and sentenced to twenty-five years in prison on the basis of the victim’s identification alone. In June 2014, Brown was exonerated of the crime when DNA evidence revealed that he could not have been the attacker. The DNA evidence was an exact match to a seventeen-year-old Black male who had been living within blocks of the apartment complex where the victim had been attacked. Nevertheless, Brown spent nearly seventeen years in prison for a crime that he did not commit.

  • Strip Searching in the Age of Colorblind Racism: The Disparate Impact of Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Burlington

    In 2012, the Supreme Court of the United States decided Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Burlington. The Court held that full strip searches, including cavity searches, are permissible regardless of the existence of basic reasonable suspicion that the arrestee is in possession of contraband. Further, the Court held that law enforcement may conduct full strip searches after arresting an individual for a minor offense and irrespective of the circumstances surrounding the arrest. These holdings upended typical search jurisprudence. Florence sanctions the overreach of state power and extends to law enforcement and corrections officers the unfettered discretion to conduct graphically invasive, suspicion-less strip searches. The Court’s dereliction of duty is enough to concern all citizens. However, the impact of this phenomenal lapse will not be felt equally in the age of what Bonilla-Silva has termed colorblind racism. In 2013, in the case of Floyd v. City of New York, Judge Shira A. Scheindlin found that between January 2004 and June 2012, the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”) made 4.4 million stops. She further found that more than eighty percent of these 4.4 million stops were of Blacks or Hispanics. Specifically, Judge Scheindlin found that in “52% of the 4.4 million stops, the person stopped was black, in 31% the person [stopped] was Hispanic, and in 10% the person stopped was white.” This rate of stops and frisks is grossly disproportionate to Black and Hispanic population representation in New York City and the United States in general. Further, as Judge Scheindlin astutely points out, “The NYPD’s policy of targeting ‘the right people’ for stops . . . is not directed toward the identification of a specific perpetrator, rather, it is a policy of targeting expressly identified racial groups for stops in general.” These findings make clear that Florence and colorblind racism enable law enforcement to wage war against the civil rights of minority citizens. This Article argues that the Court’s phenomenal lapse in Florence and its general abdication of law enforcement oversight inevitably subjects minorities, particularly Blacks and Latinos, to the blanket authority of law enforcement to harass and humiliate based on perfunctory arrests predicated on the slightest of infractions. Other legal analyses of Florence have largely ignored, and hence minimized, the salience of race when thinking about strip searches. In light of the significant consequential impacts of this decision on minority populations, this oversight is itself unreasonable. This paper will analyze the rationale and policy implications, particularly for people of color, in light of Florence. Finally, I will also propose policy recommendations to temper the projected negative impacts of the decision.

  • The Danger of Nonrandom Case Assignment: How the Southern District of New York’s “Related Cases” Rule Shaped Stop-and-Frisk Rulings

    The Southern District of New York’s local rules are clear: “[A]ll active judges . . . shall be assigned substantially an equal share of the categories of cases of the court over a period of time.” Yet for the past fourteen years, Southern District Judge Shira Scheindlin has been granted near-exclusive jurisdiction over one category of case: those involving wide-sweeping constitutional challenges to the New York Police Department’s (NYPD) stop-and-frisk policies. In 1999, Judge Scheindlin was randomly assigned Daniels v. City of New York, the first in a series of high-profile and high-impact stop-and-frisk cases. Since then, she has overseen an uninterrupted stream of equally landmark stop-and-frisk cases, which culminated in an August 12, 2013 order granting a sweeping injunction against the NYPD. The cases were assigned according to the Southern District’s “related cases” local rule, which allows judges to “accept” a new case related to an earlierfiled case already on their docket. Unlike past stop-and-frisk scholarship, this Article addresses the procedural rules that have shaped the development of stop-and-frisk law, arguing that case assignment rules should not permit any district judge to exert total control over the evolution of significant Constitutional jurisprudence. The Article begins by challenging the commonly-held assumption that federal cases are assigned to district judges at random. It explains that although random assignment is widely assumed and generally heralded, it is not enforceable. Instead, district courts retain discretion to assign cases as they wish, with little (if any) obligation for transparency. The Article looks specifically to the Southern District of New York’s Local Rules, examining the numerous ways in which cases are assigned to specific judges according to the cases’ subject matter, through a system hidden from the public and devoid of over-sight. The Article then traces stop-and-frisk litigation from its roots in Terry v. Ohio to the complex and protracted stop-and-frisk cases filed in federal courts across the country today. It explains how police have utilized stop-and-frisk practices before and after Terry, focusing on the Giuliani-era theory of “hot-spot policing.” The Article turns to the stop-and-frisk litigation previously and currrently assigned to Judge Scheindlin and uses it to examine the serious—and substantive— consequences of nonrandom case assignment in an adversary system. Nonrandom assignment allows an interested judge to inject herself into the litigation as a player with a stake in the outcome. Giving one district judge power over an entire category of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, for example, elevates her decisions to a quasi-appellate level of significance, violating the principle that a district court opinion is not binding on any court within the same district. This Article proposes amendments to the Southern District’s Local Rules to prohibit manipulation of case assignments, advocates for the publication of assignment decisions, and suggests appropriate motion practice for challenging the assignments. Finally, the Article evaluates the impact Judge Scheindlin’s control over this area of the law may have if appealed to the Supreme Court. Because her decisions take a broad view of a plaintiff’s right to enforce the Fourth Amendment, they may be subject to reversal, consequently narrowing the rights at stake. On December 23, 2013, some but not all of the changes to the Southern District of New York’s local rules suggested by this Article, which was available in draft form on the Social Science Research Network, and cited in an article that appeared in November in the Wall Street Journal, were implemented. The changes, and their shortcomings, are described in the Article’s Afterword.

  • The Court Loses its Way with the Global Positioning System: United States v. Jones Retreats to the “Classic Trespassory Search”

    This Article analyzes United States v. Jones, in which the Supreme Court considered whether government placement of a global positioning system (GPS) device on a vehicle to follow a person’s movements constituted a Fourth Amendment “search.” The Jones Court ruled that two distinct definitions existed for a Fourth Amendment “search.” In addition to Katz v. United States’s reasonable-expectation-of-privacy standard, which the Court had used exclusively for over four decades, the Court recognized a second kind of search that it called a “classic trespassory search.” The second kind of search occurs when officials physically trespass or intrude upon a constitutionally protected area in order to obtain information. This work examines the concerns created by Jones’s ruling. This Article asserts that, by emphasizing property rights in bringing back the decades-old physical trespass test, Jones potentially undermined the Katz standard. Further, Jones added an inquiry into motivation by asking if the government committed the intrusion to obtain information, thus creating a subjective inquiry that is inconsistent with much of Fourth Amendment doctrine. Finally, in its attempt to distinguish its facts from earlier vehicle-tracking cases, the Court created a loophole in Fourth Amendment application that law enforcement could exploit in the future.

  • A Failure of the Fourth Amendment & Equal Protection’s Promise: How the Equal Protection Clause Can Change Discriminatory Stop and Frisk Policies

    Terry v. Ohio changed everything. Before Terry, Fourth Amendment law was settled. The Fourth Amendment had long required that police officers have probable cause in order to conduct Fourth Amendment invasions; to administer a "reasonable" search and seizure, the state needed probable cause. But in 1968, the Warren Court, despite its liberal reputation, lowered the standard police officers had to meet to conduct a certain type of search: the so-called "'stop' and 'frisk.'" A "stop and frisk" occurs when a police officer, believing a suspect is armed and crime is afoot, stops the suspect, conducts an interrogation, and pats him down for weapons. In Terry, the Supreme Court detached reasonableness from probable cause for such "limited" searches and seizures; if a police officer's suspicions, based on articulable facts, lead her to believe that crime is afoot and that a perpetrator is armed, then under the Fourth Amendment, a search for weapons is constitutionally permissible. Despite reversing precedent, Terry and its Supreme Court progeny allowed police officers to rely upon their reasonable suspicions to conduct searches only under narrow conditions. Lower courts, however, have enlarged Terry beyond recognition. Indeed, police officers now have wide latitude to stop and frisk suspects. From the New York stop and frisk numbers flows the class-action Floyd v. City of New York. In Floyd, minority plaintiffs contend that the city's stop and frisk practices unconstitutionally infringe upon personal liberty. The Fourth Amendment as currently interpreted, however, permits cities like New York to promulgate stop and frisk practices that result in racial harassment. What constitutional tool, then, can compel local governments and police departments to revamp their discriminatory stop and frisk techniques? The answer must be the Equal Protection Clause.