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  • Towards a Balanced Approach for the Protection of Native American Sacred Sites

    Protection of "sacred sites" is very important to Native American religious practitioners because it is intrinsically tied to the survival of their cultures, and therefore to their survival as distinct peoples. The Supreme Court in Oregon v. Smith held that rational basis review, and not strict scrutiny, was the appropriate level of judicial review when evaluating the constitutionality of neutral laws of general applicability even when these laws impacted one's ability to practice a religion. Reacting to the decision, Congress enacted the Relgious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which reinstated the strict scrutiny test for challenges to neutral laws of general applicability alleged to have substantially burdened free exercise rights. In a controversial 2008 decision, the Ninth Circuit held that a "substantial burden" under RFRA is only imposed when individuals are either coerced to act contrary to their religious beliefs or forced to choose between following the tenets of their religion and receiving a governmental benefit. In all likelihood, such a narrow definition of substantial burden will prevent Native American practitioners from successfully invoking RFRA to protect their sacred sites. In this Article, I first explore whether the Ninth Circuit's definition of "substantial burden" is mandated under RFRA. To a large degree, this question comes down to whether a pre-RFRA Supreme Court decision, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery, precludes courts from adopting a broader definition of what is a substantial burden under RFRA. Although this Article contends that neither Lyng nor RFRA precludes the adoption of a broader definition of "substantial burden," the Article nevertheless acknowledges that many judges may disagree. The Article therefore recommends enactment of a legislative solution. The legislation proposed is a compromise between the needs of Indian religious practitioners and those who argue that religious practitioners should not have a veto over how federal lands are used and developed. Therefore, in return for the broadening of what can constitute a substantial burden on free exercise rights, the Article recommends the adoption of an intermediate type of judicial scrutiny. The Article also discusses ways to limit what can be considered sacred sites under the legislation so as to ensure protection of sites vital to Native American culture and religion without unnecessarily burdening federal management of federal lands.

  • In Defense of the Indian Child Welfare Act In Aggravated Circumstances

    The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) affords various protections to Indian families throughout child welfare proceedings. Among them is the duty imposed upon the state to provide rehabilitative services to families prior to the outplacement of an Indian child, or termination of parental rights. An analogous provision for non-Indians in the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) excuses rehabilitative services in "aggravated circumstances" of child abuse. The ICWA contains no such exception, and that absence has been controversial. In 2002, the Alaska Supreme Court applied ASFA's aggravated circumstances exception to the ICWA, thereby excusing services when a father severely abused his three Native children. In 2005, the South Dakota Supreme Court addressed the same issue, but expressly refused to engraft such an exception into the ICWA. This Note defends South Dakota's position on policy grounds. It chiefly argues that an aggravated circumstances exception would do violence to the ICWA and its family preservation goals, and further that such an exception is unnecessary to protect Native children from dangerous parents.

  • Rethinking Customary Law in Tribal Court Jurisprudence

    Customary law still appears in many of the decisions of American state and federal courts. Modern courts rely less on customary law, part and parcel of the English common law adopted and adapted by the Founders of the United States, with statutory and administrative law dominating the field. In contrast, the importance of customary law in American Indian tribal courts cannot be understated. Indian tribes now take every measure conceivable to preserve Indigenous cultures and restore lost cultural knowledge and practices. Tribal court litigation, especially litigation involving tribal members and issues arising out of tribal law, often turns on the ancient customs and traditions of the people. But this development of applying customary law in tribal courts is new and undertheorized. For the first time, this Article attempts to provide an adequate theory as to how tribal judges should find and apply customary law on a normative level. This Article argues that tribal judges have a great deal to learn from H.L.A. Hart's theory of primary and secondary rules.

  • A Race or a Nation? Cherokee National Identity and the Status of Freedmen’s Descendants

    This Article examines the Cherokee Freedmen controversy to assess whether law and biology can function as sufficient models for crafting Cherokee identity at this crucial moment in the tribe's history. The author will argue that while law and biology are historically powerful frames for establishing tribal self-identity, they are inadequate to the task of determining who should enjoy national citizenship. The wise use of sovereignty, the author suggests, lies in creating a process of sustained dialogical engagement among all stakeholders in the definition of Cherokee citizenship on the question of Cherokee identity. This dialogue should ideally have been undertaken before the Nation moved to the political solution of a vote on tribal citizenship criteria. The exclusion of the Freedmen's descendants without such a dialogue may have high political and social costs to the Nation, its members, and its apparently former members. The dialogue this article proposes could be constructed along the lines suggested by sociologist Eva Garroutte, whose model of Radical Indigenism offers one means of considering these complex issues from within the Cherokee community itself.

  • The Pocahontas Exception: The Exemption of American Indian Ancestry from Racial Purity Law

    "The Pocahontas Exception" confronts the legal existence and cultural fascination with the eponymous "Indian Grandmother." Laws existed in many states that prohibited marriage between Whites and non- Whites to prevent the "quagmire of mongrelization." Yet, this racial protectionism, as ingrained in law, blatantly exempted Indian blood from the threat to White racial purity. In Virginia, the Racial Integrity Act of 1924 made exceptions for Whites of mixed descent who proudly claimed Native American ancestry from Pocahontas. This Paper questions the juridical exceptions made for Native American ancestry in antimiscegenation statutes, and analyzes the concomitant exemptions in contemporary social practice. With increasing numbers of Americans freely and lately claiming Native ancestry, this openness escapes the triumvirate of resistance, shame, and secrecy that regularly accompanies findings of partial African ancestry. The author contends that antimiscegenation laws such as the Racial Integrity Act relegate Indians to existence only in a distant past, creating a temporal disjuncture to free Indians from a contemporary discourse of racial politics. He argues that such exemptions assess Indians as abstractions rather than practicalities, which facilitates the miscegenistic exceptionalism as demonstrated in Virginia's antimiscegenation statute.

  • The Tribal Sovereign as Citizen: Protecting Indian Country Health and Welfare Through Federal Environmental Citizen Suits

    This Article suggests that federal environmental citizen suits can serve tribal sovereignty interests without presenting the legal risks tribes face when they attempt direct regulation of non-Indians. Section I briefly describes governmental regulatory roles tribes may play in the implementation of federal environmental law and policy. Section II overviews the conceptual and procedural framework for tribal claims as "citizens." Section III argues that in bringing environmental citizen suits, tribal governments exercise their inherent sovereign power and responsibility to protect the health and welfare of tribal citizens and the quality of the Indian country environment. Section IV concludes that, while suits directed at one facility cannot and should not replace comprehensive tribal programs, they offer concrete benefits to tribes without risking adverse judicial decisions on the scope of tribal sovereignty and Indian country.

  • Individual Aboriginal Rights

    This Article will, in Section I, deal with the legal development of the concept of individual aboriginal rights. It will focus on the Western Shoshone land claims before the Indian Claims Commission, and the federal government's trespass claims against the ranching operations of the redoubtable, irrepressible Dann sisters. Section II will explore the development and utilization of the doctrine of individual aboriginal rights in a series of cases involving the Dann sisters, subsequent Western Shoshone, and other efforts by native people to secure subsistence hunting and fishing rights and possession of or access to sacred sites. Section III will explore some related concepts in western public land law. This Section suggests that custom, prescription, access under nineteenth century self-executing right of way statutes, regulatory efforts, and administrative accommodation have provided at least some protection for the access of tribal peoples to sacred sites. Section IV will speculate about the future expansion of such efforts, and explore the possibility that the growth of colorblind equal protection doctrine will spread into the area of Indian law and threaten what Charles Wilkinson has called the "measured separatism" of tribal sovereignty and property.

  • The Plight of “Nappy-Headed” Indians: The Role of Tribal Sovereignty in the Systematic Discrimination Against Black Freedmen by the Federal Government and Native American Tribes

    This Note concerns the role the government has played in the exclusion of Black Freedmen from Native American nations through its implementation and interpretation of the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity ("tribal sovereignty" or "tribal immunity"). Part I discusses the background of the Freedmen within the Five Civilized Tribes and provides an overview of the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity, including its role in the controversy concerning the status of Black Indians. Part II discusses the interpretations given to the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity by United States courts and executive agencies and the effects of those interpretations on relations between Native Americans and Freedmen. Part III discusses the roles that Congress, executive agencies, and the courts must take to halt and reverse the discriminatory practices that have stripped Freedmen of their rights and privileges as members of Native American communities.

  • Abandoning the PIA Standard: A Comment on Gila V

    Part I of this Note examines the development of Indian reserved water rights, and the practicably irrigable acreage method of quantifying those rights, as defined by the Court. Part II describes the arguments of state and private interests that oppose broad Indian water rights. Part III discusses Gila V, including the Arizona Supreme Court's rationale for abandoning the standard set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court and the standard for quantifying Indian reserved rights that the court applied in its place. Part IV analyzes the Arizona Supreme Court's justifications for abandoning the standard, and considers alternate grounds for the decision. Ultimately, this Note concludes that the Arizona Supreme Court misinterpreted precedent and wrongfully rejected the standard established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Arizona I and Arizona II. Thus, Gila V should be viewed as an abrogation of the established standard for defining Indian water rights and not serve as precedent.

  • Not Because They are Brown, But Because of Ea*: Why the Good Guys Lost in Rice V. Cayetano, and Why They Didn’t Have to Lose

    Part II of this Article therefore reviews the history of Native Hawaiians in the broader context of the history of federal Indian law, focusing on the vacillating congressional policies regarding Indians and how those policies almost always treated Indian tribes as political entities rather than ethnic communities. Part III reviews and analyzes the procedural history of the Rice case and its resolution by the Supreme Court. Part IV concludes with the argument that constitutionally-permissible alternative methodologies exist for accomplishing the same objective of self-determination for Native Hawaiians