Articles

Filter

  • Employee Free Choice or Employee Forged Choice? Race in the Mirror of Exclusionary Hierarchy

    The Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA) is arguably the most transformative piece of labor legislation to come before Congress since the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA). One of the newest attempts to transform labor relations is the EFCA. The first to disappear under the EFCA would be a system of union democracy whereby unions could only obtain the rights of exclusive representation for firms if they could prevail in a secret-ballot election. Second, the EFCA would eliminate tile necessity of a freely negotiated collective bargaining agreement between management and labor and instead substitute compulsory arbitration. While some labor union advocates contend that law ought to be conceived of as a vehicle to democratize tile workplace by redistributing power in labor markets in favor of workers, while concurrently demolishing hierarchical command structures that entrench gender, race and class lines, this proposal would likely expand labor hierarchy, labor market cartelization and diminish the employment prospects of racial minorities. As such, the EFCA is marked by contradiction. This Article deploys Critical Race Reformist theory, economics and apartheid-era South African labor history in order to shot' that rather than embracing freedom for workers, eliminating, poverty, and expanding opportunities for all, this proposal would likely invert such goals and instead operate consistently with the record of exclusion and subordination tied to American Progressivism and the labor movement.

  • Rawls and Reparations

    In the past two years, four related events have sharpened debates on race in the U.S.: President Obama's election, the nomination of Judge Sonia Sotomayor to the Supreme Court, that Court's ruling in Ricci v. DeStefano, and the arrest of Obama's friend, Harvard professor Henry Gates. The President has spoken of a "teaching moment" arising from these events. Moreover, his writings, speeches and lawmaking efforts illustrate the contractual nature of Obama's thinking. The President (and all concerned citizens) should thus find useful an analysis of racial policy and justice in light of the work of John Rauls. Rawls may be the most influential political theorist of our time. Applying his theory to questions of race policy, this Article defends the following counterintuitive thesis: while strong forms of affirmative action cannot be derived from Rawls's theory, strong forms of legislative reparations can be so derived. This Article concludes with a concrete plan for raising the resources such reparations would require.

  • Poll Workers, Election Administration, and the Problem of Implicit Bias

    Racial bias in election administration-more specifically, in the interaction between poll workers and voters at a polling place on election day-may be implicit, or unconscious. Indeed, the operation of a polling place may present an "optimal" setting for unconscious racial bias. Poll workers sometimes have legal discretion to decide whether or not a prospective voter gets to cast a ballot, and they operate in an environment where they may have to make quick decisions, based on little information, with few concrete incentives for accuracy, and with little opportunity to learn from their errors. Even where the letter of the law does not explicitly allow for a poll worker to exercise discretion, there is a strong possibility that unconscious bias could play a role in poll worker decision-making. Whether a poll workers' discretion is de jure or de facto, the result may be race-based discrimination between prospective voters. This Article addresses how unconscious bias may play a role in the interaction between poll workers and prospective voters and discusses some ways in which the potential for unconscious bias to operate in America's polling places may be mitigated.

  • Eatin’ Good? Not in This Neighborhood: A Legal Analysis of Disparities in Food Availability and Quality at Chain Supermarkets in Poverty-Stricken Areas

    Many Americans-especially the poor-face severe hurdles in their attempts to secure the most basic of human needs-food. One reason for this struggle is the tendency of chain supermarkets to provide a limited selection of goods and a lower quality of goods to patrons in less affluent neighborhoods. Healthier items such as soy milks, fresh fish, and lean meats are not present in these stores, and the produce that is present is typically well past the peak of freshness. Yet, if the same patron were to go to another supermarket owned by the same chain--but located in a wealthier neighborhood-she would find a wide selection of healthy foods and fresh produce. What are the poor people who live in the inner cities--who are disproportionately African American and Latino-to do? How can they obtain healthy food against these odds? This Article argues that the actions of the supermarkets are unconscionable, and therefore proposes a federal law that will prevent chain grocery stores from engaging in such practices. The Article first examines the scope of the problem created by these supermarket practices. The Article then explains why current laws are inadequate to address this issue. Finally, the Article proposes that Congress use its authority under the Commerce Clause to enact legislation that would require supermarket chains to carry the same selection and quality of goods at all stores in the same chain.

  • Performing Discretion or Performing Discrimination: Race, Ritual, and Peremptory Challenges in Capital Jury Selection

    Research shows the mere presence of Blacks on capital juries-- on the rare occasions they are seated--can mean the difference between life and death. Peremptory challenges are the primary method to remove these pivotal participants. Batson v. Kentucky developed hearings as an immediate remedy for the unconstitutional removal of jurors through racially motivated peremptory challenges. These proceedings have become rituals that sanction continued bias in the jury selection process and ultimately affect the outcome of capital trials. This Article deconstructs the role of the Batson ritual in legitimating the removal of African American jurors. These perfunctory hearings fail to meaningfully interrogate the reasons prosecutors offer as race neutral motivations for peremptorily striking Black jurors.

  • Teaching Whren to White Kids

    This Article addresses issues at the intersection of United States v. Whren and Grutter v. Bollinger at a time when the reality of racial profiling was recently illustrated by the high-profile arrest of a prominent Harvard professor. Given the highly racialized nature of criminal procedure, there is a surprising dearth of writing about the unique problems of teaching issues such as racial profiling in racially homogeneous classrooms. Because African American and other minority students often experience the criminal justice system in radically different ways than do Whites, the lack of minority voices poses a significant barrier to effectively teaching criminal procedure. This Article critiques current law school pedagogical approaches and suggests that we must both re-think academic methods for teaching criminal procedure within the classroom and expose 'post-racial" mythologizing outside the classroom.

  • Choosing Those Who Will Die: The Effect of Race, Gender, and Law in Prosecutorial Decision to Seek the Death Penalty in Durham County, North Carolina

    District prosecutors in the United States exercise virtually unfettered power and discretion to decide which murder cases to prosecute for capital punishment. According to neoclassical theory of formal legal rationality, the process for determining criminal punishment should be based upon legal rules established and sanctioned by the state to communicate the priorities of the political community. The theory therefore argues in favor of a determinate mode of decision-making that diminishes the importance of extrinsic elements such as race and gender in the application of law. In the empirical research herein reported, I test this theory using death eligible cases in Durham County, North Carolina from 2003 to 2007. The analysis indicates that although law has an important effect in determining criminal punishment, extrinsic elements such as race and gender overwhelm the law in influencing prosecutorial decisions to go for death. Durham county prosecutors are 43% more likely to seek the death penalty when a Black defendant kills a White victim compared to a situation where a Black defendant kills a Black victim. The analysis also demonstrates the existence of a gender gap in prosecutorial decision-making. Female murder victims are significantly more likely to precipitate a capital prosecution compared to male victims. These results have important policy implications. Despite publicized attempts by the Supreme Court to eradicate the twin evils of arbitrariness and discrimination from our system of capital punishment, these problems persist. Therefore, it is important for policy makers to devise explicit mechanisms to channel the discretionary judgments of local prosecutors toward greater reliance upon legal precepts rather than extra-legal considerations such as race and sex. As Justice William Brennan warned in his dissent in McKleskey v. Kemp, "The way in which we choose those who will die reveals the depth of moral commitment among the living."

  • Determining the (In)Determinable: Race in Brazil and the United States

    In recent years, the Brazilian states of Rio de Janeiro, So Paulo, and Mato Grasso du Sol have implemented race-conscious affirmative action programs in higher education. These states established admissions quotas in public universities for Afro-Brazilians or afrodescendentes. As a result, determining who is "Black'' has become a complex yet important undertaking in Brazil. Scholars and the general public alike have claimed that the determination of Blackness in Brazil is different than in the United States; determining Blackness in the United States is allegedly a simpler task than in Brazil. In Brazil it is widely acknowledged that most Brazilians are descendants of Africans in light of the pervasive miscegenation that occurred during and after the Portuguese and Brazilian enslavement of Africans. As a result, Brazilians ubiquitously profess their African ancestry. Yet, a highly stratified racial classification system exists in Brazil whereby the guiding principle for determining race is one's physical appearance—hair texture, skin color, nose size, eye shape, for example. However, it is commonly assumed that the rule of hypodescent-the presence of one African ancestor defines an individual as Black-determines an individual's "Blackness" in the United States. Accordingly, ancestry allegedly determines Blackness in the United States dissimilarly to Brazil, where one's physical appearance is determinative. Contrary to the proposition that race, and specifically Blackness, is fundamentally different in Brazil and the United States, Professor Greene contends that one's physical appearance is the primary determinant of Blackness in both American nations. Indeed, one's ancestry is necessarily implicated in determining race based on “physical appearance," as this method of classifying race is grounded in socially mediated presumptions concerning how an individual's physical appearance denotes his or her genetic makeup. Thus, in this Article, Professor Greene mitigates the void in Brazil/U.S. comparative scholarship discussing race-conscious affirmative action by delineating the universality of race, racial hierarchy, and racial ideology in Brazil and the United States.
    • Article
    • Business
    • By Marjorie Florestal
    • Volume 14, Issue 1
    • January, 2008

    Is a Burrito a Sandwich? Exploring Race, Class, and Culture in Contracts

    A superior court in Worcester, Massachusetts, recently determined that a burrito is not a sandwich. Surprisingly, the decision sparked a firestorm of media attention. Worcester, Massachusetts, is hardly the pinnacle of the culinary arts-so why all the interest in the musings of one lone judge on the nature of burritos and sandwiches? Closer inspection revealed the allure of this otherwise peculiar case: Potentially thousands of dollars turned on the interpretation of a single word in a single clause of a commercial contract. Judge Locke based his decision on "common sense" and a single definition of sandwich-"two thin pieces of bread, usually buttered, with a thin layer (as of meat, cheese, or savory mixture) spread between them." The only barrier to the burrito's entry into the sacred realm of sandwiches is an additional piece of bread? What about the one-slice, open-face sandwich? Or the club sandwich, typically served as a double-decker with three pieces of bread? What about wraps? The court's definition lacked subtlety, complexity or nuance; it was rigid, not allowing for the possibility of change and evolution. It was a decision couched in the "primitive formalism" Judge Cardozo derided nearly ninety years ago when he said "[t]he law has outgrown its primitive stage of formalism when the precise word was a sovereign talisman, and every slip was fatal. It takes a broader view to-day." Does it? Despite the title of this piece, the goal is not to determine with any legal, scientific or culinary specificity whether a burrito is a sandwich. Rather, the author explores what lies beneath the "primitive formalism" or somewhat smug determination of the court that common sense answers the question for us. This Article suggests Judge Locke's gut-level understanding that burritos are not sandwiches actually masks an unconscious bias. The author explores this bias by examining the determination of this case and the impact of race, class and culture on contract principles.

  • From Pedagogical Sociology to Constitutional Adjudication: The Meaning of Desegregation in Social Science Research and Law

    In the United States following the case of Brown v. Board of Education (1954) federal judges with responsibility for public school desegregation but no expertise in education or schools management appointed experts from the social sciences to act as court advisors. In Boston, MA, educational sociologists helped Judge W. Arthur Garrity design a plan with educational enhancement at its heart, but the educational outcomes were marginalized by a desegregation jurisprudence conceptualized in terms of race rather than education. This Article explores the frustration of outcomes in Boston by reference to the differing conceptualizations of desegregation in law and social science. It argues that whereas social scientists see desegregation in terms of social change requiring integration, for lawyers desegregation is a remedy the content of which is shaped by the nature of the litigation. The imperatives of law and social science have in the past coincided in a jurisprudence of affirmative action but the recent school assignment cases demonstrate the extent to which they have now diverged. This divergence underlies the indeterminacy of the desegregation mandate and provides an analytical framework for a theory of the role of the court expert in schools desegregation.