All content tagged with: Voting Rights

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  • Poll Workers, Election Administration, and the Problem of Implicit Bias

    Racial bias in election administration-more specifically, in the interaction between poll workers and voters at a polling place on election day-may be implicit, or unconscious. Indeed, the operation of a polling place may present an "optimal" setting for unconscious racial bias. Poll workers sometimes have legal discretion to decide whether or not a prospective voter gets to cast a ballot, and they operate in an environment where they may have to make quick decisions, based on little information, with few concrete incentives for accuracy, and with little opportunity to learn from their errors. Even where the letter of the law does not explicitly allow for a poll worker to exercise discretion, there is a strong possibility that unconscious bias could play a role in poll worker decision-making. Whether a poll workers' discretion is de jure or de facto, the result may be race-based discrimination between prospective voters. This Article addresses how unconscious bias may play a role in the interaction between poll workers and prospective voters and discusses some ways in which the potential for unconscious bias to operate in America's polling places may be mitigated.

  • Let’s Not Jump to Conclusions: Approaching Felon Disenfranchisement Challenges Under the Voting Rights Act

    Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 invalidates voting qualifications that deny the right to vote on account of race or color. This Article confronts a split among the federal appellate courts concerning whether felons may rely on Section 2 when challenging felon disenfranchisement laws. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals allows felon disenfranchisement challenges under Section 2; however, the Second and Eleventh Circuits foresee unconstitutional consequences and thus do not. After discussing the background of voting rights jurisprudence, history of felon disenfranchisement laws, and evolution of Section 2, this Article identifies the points of contention among the disagreeing courts. The crux of this Article is that both sides of the debate have erred. Both sides wrongly assume that the consequences of accepting these vote denial challenges are predictable. However, because a standard approach to vote denial challenges under Section 2 does not currently exist, no court can foresee the results of allowing such challenges to felon disenfranchisement laws. Therefore, predicting the constitutional implications of accepting these challenges without first identifying an appropriate analysis is impossible. This Article concludes by proposing an analysis for consideration. The proposed approach is a tailored version of sliding scale scrutiny--an analysis that the United States Supreme Court following Burdick v. Takushi, now applies to constitutional voting rights claims. Using this adapted approach, the Supreme Court can resolve the current split in authority and find that Section 2 is a viable vehicle for challenging racially-discriminatory felon disenfranchisement laws.

  • The Politics of Preclearance

    This Essay examines recent charges of political motivation against the Department of Justice and its enforcement of the Voting Rights Act. These accusations appear well-deserved, on the strength of the Department's recent handling of the Texas redistricting submission and Georgia's voting identification requirement. This Essay reaches two conclusions. First, it is clear that Congress wished to secure its understanding of the Act into the future through its preclearance requirement. Many critics of the voting rights bill worried about the degree of discretion that the legislation accorded the Attorney General. Supporters worried as well, for this degree of discretion might lead to under-enforcement of the Act. Yet Congress chose not to act on those concerns while placing the Department of Justice at the center of its voting rights revolution. By and large, this is the way that the Supreme Court has understood the Department's role. Second, the currently available data do not support the charge that politics has played a central role in the Department's enforcement of its preclearance duties. This conclusion holds true for preclearance decisions up until the Clinton years. The data are ambiguous with respect to the Justice Department of President George W. Bush.

  • The Power of Observation: The Role of Federal Observers Under the Voting Rights Act

    The Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) is one of the most successful civil rights laws ever enacted. Following its passage, the promise of the Fifteenth Amendment has become a reality for millions of Americans. Black voters in the South register to vote without being subjected to discriminatory tests or devices. Minority citizens can cast ballots free of intimidation and violence. Barriers posed by English-only elections have been removed for many language minority voters. Voters are permitted to receive assistance from the person of their choice. Federal observers play an indispensable role in serving as the eyes and ears of the Federal Government and the public it protects to ensure compliance with the Act. This Article explores the role of federal observers under the recently reauthorized VRA. It describes the federal observer provisions, including the role of observers, where they are deployed, how they are trained, and the ways in which their reports are used. It outlines steps that have been taken to ensure the provisions are constitutional by allowing observers to observe all steps of the voting process while preserving ballot secrecy. It explains why federal observers must be kept neutral and free from partisanship. It concludes with a discussion of the substantial role that federal observers played in securing the voting rights for limited-English proficient Spanish-speaking voters in Passaic County, New Jersey, in the face of widespread disenfranchisement. By preventing discrimination, enforcing the VRA, and measuring progress of non-compliant jurisdictions, federal observers help "secure equal voting rights of all citizens."

  • The End of Preclearance as We Knew It: How the Supreme Court Transformed Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act

    This Article’s analysis reveals that by the 1990s the intent, or purpose, prong of Section 5 had become the dominant basis for objections to discriminatory voting changes. During that decade an astonishing 43 percent of all objections were, according to this assessment, based on discriminatory purpose alone. Thus, a key issue for Congress in determining how to deal with the preclearance requirement of the Act due to expire in 2007-assuming it seeks to restore the protection of minority voting rights that existed before January 2000-is whether to revise the language of Section 5 so as to restore the long-accepted definition of purpose thrown out by Bossier II. The authors believe that the analysis in the following pages provides critical evidence for the debate over reauthorization and revision of the Voting Rights Act.

  • After Georgia V. Ashcroft: The Primacy of Proportionality

    This Note argues that the majority in Ashcroft have left courts with an unadministerable standard-not so much for reasons that Justice Souter articulated in his dissent, but rather because the Court provided no guidance on navigating around the myriad of factors in the convoluted totality analyses. In the face of this uncertainty, lower courts will rely increasingly on the proportionality standard of Johnson v. De Grandy, which marked the midpoint in the judicial shift from Justice Brennan's worldview to Justice O'Connor's world-view. Part I examines two cases after Ashcroft which represent different degrees of racial vote dilution: Shirt v. Hazeltine and Session v. Perry. In Shirt, American Indians in South Dakota suffered a history of voting discrimination, racially polarized voting, and a dearth of safe districts; while in Session, Blacks and Latinos in Texas at least possessed a larger proportion of safe districts. What emerges from the comparison, then, is the tendency of proportionality to neutralize history and polarization. Through other post-Ashcroft cases, Part II teases out the differences (i) between influence districts as injury and remedy and (ii) between a jurisdiction's Section 5 and Section 2 obligations—details closely related to how proportionality is measured. Finally, Part III discusses substantive representation, the ideology that drove much of Ashcroft's analysis. Framing it as a symptom of nonpolarized voting, this Note concludes that endorsement of substantive representation as a device to achieve colorblindness will obscure the causes of polarization.

  • Felon Disenfrachisement Laws: Partisan Politics in the Legislatures

    This examination of the institutional changes to state legislatures, synthesized with an analysis of the handling of felon disenfranchisement laws by state legislatures, presents a troubling realization about the law today: in the twenty-first century, partisan politics moderates decisions about even the most basic and fundamental principles of democracy. This Note suggests that because state legislators follow their party leadership and position, a state's traditional treatment of racial minorities, geographic location, and even ideology are not the strongest indicators of a state's disenfranchisement laws. Rather, partisan politics drives changes to the state laws governing felon voter eligibility.

  • Redefining American Democracy: Do Alternative Voting Systems Capture the True Meaning of “Representation”?

    This Article explores whether alternative voting systems are compatible with the meaning of representation in the United States. Part II begins by examining the role of geographical representation and the effect it has on the ability of individuals and groups of voters to give or withhold their consent. Part III follows this inquiry by assessing the relationship between representatives and constituents under majoritarian and proportional systems to determine the consequences of moving away from geographical representation towards models designed to enhance opportunities for all voters to choose winning candidates. A description of what a "majority" is and when and how it is attained to secure the people's consent then is taken up in Part IV, providing some insight into the extent to which departures from majority rule are consistent with the American conception of representation. This discussion leads into Part V, which evaluates the role of our two-party system and ascertains whether proportional models of representation can cure the perceived defects of winner-take-all elections without undermining the continued stability of our Republic.

  • Lowering the Preclearance Hurdle Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board, 120 S. Ct. 866 (2000)

    This Case Note examines a recent Supreme Court decision that collapses the purpose and effect prongs of Section 5, effectively lowering the barrier to preclearance for covered jurisdictions. In Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board II the Court determined that Section 5 disallows only voting plans that are enacted with a retrogressive purpose (i.e., with the purpose to "worsen" the position of minority voters). The Court held that Section 5 does not prohibit preclearance of a plan enacted with a discriminatory purpose but without a retrogressive effect. Evidence of a Section 2 violation alone will not be enough to prove a jurisdiction's discriminatory purpose and prevent Section 5 preclearance.

  • Sense and Nonsense: Standing in the Racial Districting Cases as a Window on the Supreme Court’s View of the Right to Vote

    Congressional redistricting draws the lines within which battles for political power will be fought. It is no surprise, therefore, that the redistricting process has long been the subject of social debate and legal dispute. The Supreme Court has not been able to resolve this dispute, in part, because the Justices have conflicting interpretations of the right to vote. While some Justices view voting as an individual right, others maintain that voting is correctly perceived as group right. This lack of consensus regarding the definition of the right to vote has led to a confusing articulation of the harm implicated by recent districting cases, and of the identification of which citizens can seek redress for that harm. In this Article, the Author provides an overview of modern standing doctrine and focuses on the Court's application (or non- application) in districting cases of the requirement that plaintiffs show an injury-in-fact in order to have standing to sue. It is noted that in recent districting cases, the Court has allowed standing for the type of generalized grievance for which the Court has consistently denied standing in other areas of law. This deviation from established standing doctrine is often criticized as nonsensical. The Author however, argues that this new standing doctrine can only be explained and understood, when limited to voting cases, as reflective of the individual justices' interpretations of the right to vote. The Author concludes that the atypical standing doctrine articulated in the recent districting cases underscores the need for the Court to develop and employ a richer conception of the right to vote that encompasses the goal of achieving a politically fair system.