All content tagged with: First Amendment

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  • The Resilience of Noxious Doctrine: The 2016 Election, the Marketplace of Ideas, and the Obstinacy of Bias

    The Supreme Court has recognized the central role that free expression plays in our democratic enterprise. In his dissenting opinion in United States v. Abrams, Justice Holmes offered a theory of how free expression advances our search for truth and our cultivation of an informed electorate. That model—often called the “marketplace of ideas,” based upon the metaphor used by Holmes—has proven to be one of the most persistent and influential concepts in First Amendment jurisprudence. The marketplace of ideas model essentially holds that free expression serves our democratic goals by allowing differing proposed truths and versions of the facts to compete with each other for acceptance. The theory maintains that the best ideas and the most reliable information will emerge and prevail. The well-informed electorate that results from this process will then make better decisions in our participatory democracy. During the 2016 presidential election, however, it became apparent that a number of statements made by then-candidate Donald Trump proved difficult to rebut in the public dialogue, even though they were clearly and demonstrably false. Of particular concern, some of those statements fed into biases against and stereotypes of racial, ethnic, and religious minorities and women. This disinformation stubbornly resisted efforts at correction. This Article discusses the marketplace of ideas model and its underlying assumptions about how human beings process information and make decisions. It then proceeds to explain, through recent social science research, why the dynamic envisioned by the marketplace of ideas theory often fails to provide an effective counter-narrative to statements that reinforce racial, ethnic, religious, and gender biases and stereotypes. The Article concludes with some necessarily preliminary and exploratory thoughts about potential curative measures.

  • There Are No Racists Here: The Rise of Racial Extremism, When No One is Racist

    At first glance hate murders appear wholly anachronistic in post-racial America. This Article suggests otherwise. The Article begins by analyzing the periodic expansions of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the protection for racist expression in First Amendment doctrine. The Article then contextualizes the case law by providing evidence of how the First Amendment works on the ground in two separate areas —the enforcement of hate crime law and on university campuses that enact speech codes. In these areas, those using racist expression receive full protection for their beliefs. Part III describes social spaces—social media and employment where slurs and epithets may be used frequently. The final portion of the Article briefly explores two forms of unacknowledged racial violence—violence directed at minorities who move to white neighborhoods and extremist killings. Our inaccurate approach to bias-motivated crime and the culture of protection around racist expression, the Article concludes, leaves American society vulnerable to the danger created by racial extremists.

  • Habermas, the Public Sphere, and the Creation of a Racial Counterpublic

    In The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Jürgen Habermas documented the historical emergence and fall of what he called the bourgeois public sphere, which he defined as “[a] sphere of private people come together as a public . . . to engage [public authorities] in a debate over the general rules governing relations in the basically privatized but publicly relevant sphere of commodity exchange and social labor.” This was a space where individuals gathered to discuss with each other, and sometimes with public officials, matters of shared concern. The aim of these gatherings was not simply discourse; these gatherings allowed the bourgeoisie to use their reason to determine the boundaries of public and private and to self-consciously develop the public sphere. As Habermas writes, “[t]he medium of this political confrontation was . . . people’s public use of their reason.” The bourgeois public didn’t simply participate, but it did so both directly and critically. The development of the bourgeois public as a critical, intellectual public took place in coffeehouses, in salons, and table societies. In Great Britain, Germany, and France, particularly, the coffeehouses and the salons “were centers of criticism—literary at first, then also political—in which began to emerge, between aristocratic society and bourgeois intellectuals, a certain parity of the educated.” Intellectual equals came together and deliberated, an equality that was key in ensuring the requisite openness and deliberation. No one person dominated the discussion due to his status within the deliberative community. Instead, and above all else, the “power of the better argument” won out. Two conditions were critical to these deliberations. First, equality was key to the public sphere. Membership in the public sphere meant that no one person was above the other and all arguments were similarly treated and scrutinized. Second, the principle of universal access was crucial.8The doors of the deliberative space were open to all comers and no group or person was purposefully shut out. Seen together, these two conditions provide a blueprint for deliberative practices in a democratic society.

  • The Unconstitutionality, Ineffectiveness, and Alternatives of Gang Injunctions

    Gang violence across America puts in jeopardy the peace and tranquility of neighborhoods. Cities are challenged to keep their communities safe from gang violence. One common way in which cities attempt to combat violent gang activity is by using gang injunctions. Gang injunctions are court orders that prohibit gang members from conducting already-illegal activities such as vandalism, loitering, and use or possession of illegal drugs or weapons within a defined area. These injunctions, however, also prohibit otherwise legal activity such as associating with others within the restricted area of the injunction, using words or hand gestures, and wearing certain clothing. The increased use of gang injunctions to combat violent gang activity is a controversial tactic. The use of gang injunctions raises many constitutional concerns, including violations of the 1st, 4th, 5th, 9th, and 14th amendments. Even if interpreted as constitutional, gang injunctions have been proven ineffective in preventing and deterring gang members from engaging in violent gang activity. Critics believe that gang injunctions create gang cohesiveness, animosity towards the police, and relocate the violent crime created by gang members by pushing gang members into adjacent neighborhoods just outside the injunction's target area. Finally, there are several proven-effective alternatives to gang injunctions. This Note explores the unconstitutionality of gang injunctions, reveals the ineffectiveness of gang injunctions, and investigates more effective and efficient alternatives.

  • From Habermas to “Get Rich or Die Tryin”: Hip Hop, The Telecommunications Act of 1996, and the Black Public Sphere

    This Article explores the manner in which gangsta rappers, who are primarily young urban Black men, navigate the mass media and rap's commercialization of the gangsta image to continue to provide seeds of political expression and resistance to that image. While other scholars have considered the political nature of rap in the context of the First Amendment, this Article's approach is unique in that it is the first to explore such concepts through the lenses of Habermas' ideal public sphere and those of his critics. While many have written gangsta rap off as being commercially co-opted or useless given its misogyny, violence, and unbridled exhortation to material consumption, “political" expression, resistance and social commentary can still be found therein. This resistance and social commentary can be found when gangsta rap is analyzed within the broader framework of the public sphere, particularly given the invisibility and marginalization of Black men in much public space in America, and the entangled relationship between gangsta rappers, the market, and the mass media.

  • Splitting Hairs: Why Courts Uphold Prison Grooming Policies and Why They Should Not

    Part I of this Note describes the substance of prison grooming policies and provides a sampling of cases that have challenged these policies under the Equal Protection and Free Exercise Clauses. Part II explores three theories of discrimination that describe certain types of discriminatory conduct that could be prohibited by the Equal Protection and Free Exercise Clauses. These theories inform the definition of "equal protection of the laws" and impact the analysis of equal protection challenges to prison grooming policies. Part III explores the "religious exemptions" doctrine and explains how courts have interpreted the protections offered to religious groups by the Free Exercise Clause. This Part also explores the ways in which the development of the Free Exercise Clause has mirrored the development of the Equal Protection Clause and argues that these similarities justify a similar analysis of challenges to prison grooming policies brought under either theory. Part IV analyzes prison grooming policies by interpreting the constitutional provisions to prohibit oppressive discriminatory conduct directed at minority group members. Part V concludes this Note by arguing that adoption of an anti-oppression theory of discrimination in the analysis of Free Exercise and Equal Protection claims requires courts to strike down prison grooming policies.

  • Breaking the Camel’s Back: A Consideration of Mitigatory Criminal Defenses and Racism-Related Mental Illness

    This article will examine the concept of racist words, symbols, and actions that are used as weapons to "ambush, terrorize, wound, humiliate, and degrade,” as psychological and physiological violence. The implications of such violence are relevant to several affirmative defenses and, indeed, to the initial formulation of mens rea. The historical and contextual legacy that is intentionally invoked by the utilization of racialized violence is what separates the racial epithet or racially violent symbolism from other distressing insults and slurs. While First Amendment protection extends to offensive or insulting speech, the mental and physical sequelae of such speech, even absent conduct, are appropriate considerations for the criminal law, as such speech is racial violence itself and may lead to the responsive physical violence that is beyond the protection of the First Amendment.