All content tagged with: constitutional law

Filter

  • Revising the Indian Plenary Power Doctrine

    The federal Indian law doctrine of Congressional plenary power is long overdue for an overhaul. Since its troubling nineteenth-century origins in Kagama v. United States (1886), plenary power has justified invasive Congressional interventions and undermined Tribal sovereignty. The doctrine’s legal basis remains a constitutional conundrum. This Article considers the Court’s…

  • A Theory of Racialized Judicial Decision-Making

    In this Article, I introduce a theory of racialized judicial decision-making as a framework to explain how judicial decision-making as a system contributes to creating and maintaining the racial hierarchy in the United States. Judicial decision-making, I argue, is itself a racialized systemic process in which judges transpose racially-bounded cognitive schemas as they make decisions. In the process, they assign legal burdens differentially across ethnoracial groups, to the disproportionate detriment of ethnoracial minorities. After presenting this argument, I turn to three mechanisms at play in racialized judicial decision-making: (1) whiteness as capital that increases epistemic advantages in the judicial process, (2) color-evasive approaches as effective tools to justify racially disparate outcomes, and (3) the elevation of racial discrimination into a status of exceptionalism that justifies heightened standards in proving racial anti-discrimination claims. I argue that the racialized judicial decision-making process reproducing the social racial hierarchy is institutionalized via the legitimacy courts wield. I conclude with a discussion on the agency and autonomy inherent in the judicial decision-making process, emphasizing judicial decision-making is not simply a reflection of ideology—personal or otherwise—individual biases, or cultural tides, and can as a system be leveraged to further racial equity in a democratic society.

  • Carceral Socialization as Voter Suppression

    In an era of mass incarceration, many people are socialized through interactions with the carceral state. These interactions are powerful learning experiences, and by design, they are contrary to democratic citizenship. Citizenship is about belonging to a community of equals, being entitled to mutual respect and concern. Criminal punishment deliberately harms, subordinates, and stigmatizes. Encounters with the carceral system are powerful experiences of anti-democratic socialization, and they impact peoples’ sense of citizenship and trust in government. Accordingly, a large body of social science research shows that eligible voters who have carceral contact are significantly less likely to vote or to participate in politics. Hence, the carceral system’s impact on political participation goes well beyond those who are formally disenfranchised due to convictions. It also suppresses participation among the millions of legally eligible voters who have not been formally disenfranchised—people who have had more fleeting encounters with law enforcement or vicarious interactions with the carceral system. This Article considers the implications of these findings from the perspective of voting rights law and the constitutional values underlying it. In a moment when voting rights are under siege, voting rights advocates are in a heated discussion about how our federal and state constitutions protect ideals of democratic citizenship and political equality. This discussion has largely (and for good reason) focused on how the law should address what I call “de jure” suppression: tangible election laws and policies that impose legal barriers to voting, or dilute voting power. Eliminating these formal barriers to voting is vital. But, I argue, fully realizing the constitutional values underlying voting rights will also require also addressing what I call “de facto” suppression, or suppression through socialization. This occurs not through formal legal restrictions on voting, but when state institutions like the carceral system systematically socialize citizens in a manner that is incompatible with democratic citizenship. I show how de facto suppression threatens the constitutional interests protected by the right to vote just like de jure suppression does. In short, by systematically socializing people in a manner that is fundamentally incompatible with democratic citizenship, the state can effectively strip a citizen of much of the instrumental and intrinsic value conferred by the right to vote. Those who are concerned about advancing and protecting voting rights should understand the carceral system’s anti-democratic socialization as a form of political suppression—one that should warrant constitutional scrutiny for the same reasons that de jure suppression should warrant scrutiny.

  • Toward Self-Determination in the U.S. Territories: The Restorative Justice Implications of Rejecting the Insular Cases

    Conservatives and liberals alike are increasingly calling for condemnation of the Insular Cases—a series of U.S. Supreme Court cases from the early 1900s, in which the Court developed the doctrine of territorial incorporation to license the United States’ indefinite holding of overseas colonial possessions. In March 2021, members of the U.S. House of Representatives introduced House Resolution 279, which declares that the Insular Cases should be rejected as having no place in U.S. constitutional law. Moreover, in 2022, Justice Gorsuch called for the Supreme Court to squarely overrule the cases. For many, rejecting the Insular Cases is a long-overdue reckoning for U.S. colonialism. Nonetheless, some representatives and scholars from the U.S. territories have raised concerns about potential implications for existing local laws in the territories. Many of these local laws protect Indigenous territorial peoples from further colonial harms. If the proposed bill or Supreme Court’s overruling of the cases functioned to extend the U.S. Constitution in full to the territories, these laws may be found invalid under current constitutional jurisprudence. This Article employs a contextual framework for Indigenous peoples to explore the nuanced restorative-justice implications of rejecting the Insular Cases. It emphasizes the varying perspectives of Indigenous peoples of the present-day U.S. territories, who would be most impacted by the measure. Finally, flowing from this restorative justice framework, this Article demands that any resolution to the Insular Cases forward the human rights principle of self-determination for Indigenous peoples—not mere equality.

  • Carceral Intent

    For decades, scholars across disciplines have examined the stark injustice of American carceralism. Among that body of work are analyses of the various intent requirements embedded in the constitutional doctrine that governs the state’s power to incarcerate. These intent requirements include the “deliberate indifference” standard of the Eighth Amendment, which regulates prison conditions, and the “punitive intent” standard of due process jurisprudence, which regulates the scope of confinement. This Article coins the term “carceral intent” to refer collectively to those legal intent requirements and examines critically the role of carceral intent in shaping and maintaining the deep-rooted structural racism and sweeping harms of America’s system of confinement. This Article begins by tracing the origins of American carceralism, focusing on the modern prison’s relationship to white supremacy and the post-Emancipation period in U.S. history. The Article then turns to the constitutional doctrine of incarceration, synthesizing and categorizing the law of carceral intent. Then, drawing upon critical race scholarship that examines anti-discrimination doctrine and the concept of “white innocence,” the Article compares the law’s reliance on carceral intent with the law’s reliance on discriminatory intent in equal protection jurisprudence. Critical race theorists have long critiqued the intent-focused antidiscrimination doctrine as incapable of remedying structural racism and inequities. The same can be said of the doctrine of incarceration. The law’s preoccupation with an alleged wrongdoer’s “bad intent” in challenges to the scope and conditions of incarceration makes it ill-suited to remedying the U.S. prison system’s profoundly unjust and harmful features. A curative approach, this Article asserts, is one in which the law focuses on carceral effect rather than carceral intent, as others have argued in the context of equal protection. While such an approach will not remedy the full scope of harms of U.S. incarceration, it would be a start.

  • Keeping Counsel: Challenging Immigration Detention Transfers as a Violation of the Right to Retained Counsel

    In 2019 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) incarcerated nearly 500,000 individuals. More than half of the individuals detained by ICE were transferred between detention facilities, and roughly thirty percent of those transferred were moved between federal circuit court jurisdictions. Detention transfers are isolating, bewildering, and scary for the detained noncitizen and their family. They can devastate the noncitizen’s legal defense by destroying an existing attorney-client relationship or the noncitizen’s ability to obtain representation. Transfers also obstruct the noncitizen’s ability to gather evidence and may prejudicially change governing case law. This Note describes the legal framework for transfers and their legal and non-legal impacts. It contends that transfers violate noncitizens’ constitutional and statutory rights to retained counsel by obstructing the attorney-client relationship. Further, it argues that federal courts have jurisdiction to review right to counsel challenges to transfers under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Written with practitioners in mind, this Note canvasses the practical and legal difficulties of making such a challenge.

  • Predicting Supreme Court Behavior in Indian Law Cases

    This piece builds upon Matthew Fletcher’s call for additional empirical work in Indian law by creating a new dataset of Indian law opinions. The piece takes every Indian law case decided by the Supreme Court from the beginning of the Warren Court until the end of the 2019-2020 term. The scholarship first produces an Indian law scorecard that measures how often each Justice voted for the “pro- Indian” outcome. It then compares those results to the Justice’s political ideology to suggest that while there is a general trend that a more “liberal” Justice is more likely to favor the pro-Indian interest, that trend is generally weak with considerable variance from Justice to Justice. Finally, the article then creates a logistic regression model in order to try to predict whether a pro-Indian outcome is likely to prevail at the Court. It finds six potential variables to be statistically significant. It uses quantitative analysis to prove that the Indian interest is more likely to prevail when the Tribe is the appellant, when the issue is framed as a jurisdictional contest, and when the case arises from certain regions of the country. It suggests that Indian law advocates may use these insights to help influence litigation strategies in the future.

  • The Scales of Reproductive Justice: Casey’s Failure to Rebalance Liberty Interests in the Racially Disparate State of Maternal Medicine

    Despite the maternal medicine crisis in the U.S., especially for Black women, legislatures are challenging constitutional abortion doctrine and forcing women to interact with a system that may cost them their lives. This Article proposes that because of abysmal maternal mortality rates and the arbitrary nature of most abortion restrictions, the right to choose an abortion is embedded in our Fourteenth Amendment right to not be arbitrarily deprived of life by the State. This Article is a call to abortion advocates to begin submitting state maternal mortality data when challenging abortion restrictions. The call for attention to life was central to the holding in Roe v. Wade and is central to rebalancing the scales of reproductive justice.

  • Textualism’s Gaze

    This Article attempts to address why textualism distorts the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in Indian law. I start with describing textualism in federal public law. I focus on textualism as described by Justice Scalia, as well as Scalia’s justification for textualism and discussion about the role of the judiciary in interpreting texts. The Court is often subject to challenges to its legitimacy rooted in its role as legal interpreter that textualism is designed to combat.

  • Symbolism and the Thirteenth Amendment: The Injury of Exposure to Governmentally Endorsed Symbols of Racial Superiority

    One of the debates often encountered by native southerners centers around our historical symbols. There are heated opinions on both sides of the issue as to what these symbols mean and whether they should be allowed to be displayed. The latter question has begun making its way into the courts, with many southern symbols and memorials being accused of promoting the philosophy of racial supremacy. Despite the growing public concern, modern courts refuse to rule on the question. They claim they are forestalled by Article III’s standing requirement that plaintiffs must have suffered a concrete injury in fact. They state that merely asserting offense at a message does not meet this requirement, even if the message is offered by the Government. In this article, I show that holding to be incorrect. The Constitution provides certain absolute rights that the government may not infringe upon. One of those rights is the right to be free from slavery, which the courts have expanded to include all of its badges and incidents. Though courts have gone back and forth on what constitutes a badge of slavery, a historical look at the Thirteenth Amendment shows that amongst the things the drafters intended the definition to include was the philosophical message of racial supremacy if it is communicated by the government. In my article, I demonstrate that the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment includes a ban on the governmental endorsement of racial supremacy, including endorsements made in the form of symbols. I show that mere exposure to such a message is the unique form of injury that a violation of that right creates and, as such, is a concrete harm on which Article III standing can be based. Finally, I provide a workable test for determining whether a particular exposure to a symbol of racial superiority possesses all the elements necessary to constitute an injury in fact for the purposes of standing.