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Implications for Race-Based Scholarships in the Wake of SFFA
This past summer (June 29, 2023) the United States Supreme Court overturned 45 years of precedent and ruled that the University of North Carolina and Harvard University’s affirmative action programs violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by considering race in their admissions process–effectively ending affirmative education…
Students Against Fair Admissions: The Continued War on Affirmative Action
By Kyle Pham Associate Editor, Vol. 25 The Harvard Yard Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Harvard is a federal lawsuit challenging Harvard University’s consideration of race and ethnicity in its undergraduate admissions process.[1] While U.S. District Judge Allison D. Boroughs recently ruled in favor…COMMENT: How The Diversity Rationale For Affirmative Action May One Day Limit The First Amendment Rights of Universities
By Pete Osornio, Associate Editor, Volume 19 I. Diversity (Re)affirmed Grutter v. Bollinger definitively authorized the use of affirmative action policies in higher education,[1] resolving the circuit split[2] that followed the Supreme Court’s fractured opinion in Regents of University of California v. Bakke.[3] In Grutter, the Supreme Court endorsed…On Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action
On Schuette Pete Osornio Associate Editor, Michigan Journal of Race & Law Volume 19 Yesterday, in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, the Supreme Court upheld a state constitutional amendment prohibiting affirmative action preferences in college admissions, effectively making it more difficult for minorities to rectify the lasting impacts of…Affirmative Action & Negative Action: How Jian Li’s Case Can Benefit Asian Americans
In October 2006, Asian American student Jian D filed a civil rights complaint against Princeton University claiming that Princeton's affirmative action policies were discriminatory. Li argues that affirmative action gives preferences to non-Asian minorities at the expense of Asian students. Li's case aligns the interests of Asian Americans with Whites who challenge affirmative action and suggests that such policies are inherently discriminatory because they exclude students based on race and sacrifice merit. This Article argues that Li's exclusion is not due to affirmative action but is likely due to "negative action," the unfavorable treatment of Asian Americans relative to Whites. Affirmative action is not discriminatory because it considers a multitude of factors, including race, to achieve a diverse student population. Nor does affirmative action sacrifice merit; rather, it redefines merit in a way that can benefit students of all racial groups. On the other hand, negative action is discriminatory and prevalent. Whether it takes the form of legacies, admission limits or racial group comparisons, negative action discriminates against Asian Americans based on their race and contributes to existing inequalities in admissions. Framing Li's case as a claim against negative action instead of affirmative action is a more accurate analysis that attacks ongoing discrimination in admissions, but preserves affirmative action's benefit for all racial groups.From Proposition 209 to Proposal 2: Examining the Effects of Anti-Affirmative Action Voter Initiatives
Transcript of the symposium held at the University of Michigan Law School on Saturday, February 9, 2008 in Hutchins Hall Room 100Can Michigan Universities Use Proxies for Race After the Ban on Racial Preferences?
In 2003, the Supreme Court of the United States held that public universities—and the University of Michigan in particular--had a compelling reason to use race as one of many factors in their admissions processes: to reap the educational benefits of a racially diverse student body. In 2006, in response to the Supreme Court's decision, the people of Michigan approved a ballot proposal--called the Michigan Civil Rights Initiative ("MCRI")-that prohibits public universities in the state from discriminating or granting preferential treatment on the basis of race. Shortly after the MCRI was approved, a number of Michigan universities suggested that they were considering whether to use proxies for race in their admissions process in order to enroll racially diverse student bodies while circumventing the MCRI. These proxies include preferences for applicants who reside in heavily African American Detroit, applicants who are bilingual, and applicants who have lived on an Indian reservation. This Essay considers whether it is legal for the universities to use proxies for race like these in their admissions processes.Without Color of Law: The Losing Race Against Colorblindness in Michigan
This Essay examines affirmative action, while discussing its fall in California, Washington State, and ultimately Michigan.Choice and Fraud in Racial Identification: The Dilemma of Policing Race in Affirmative Action, the Census, and a Color-Blind Society
This Article focuses on the implications of self-conscious efforts by individuals to alter their racial identity and the challenge that they pose to social conventions and the law. It also considers some implications of such a framework to the promotion of a color-blind society, in particular with respect to health care services and bureaucratic records.The Color of Perspective: Affirmative Action and the Constitutional Rhetoric of White Innocence
This Article discusses the Supreme Court's use of the rhetoric of White innocence in deciding racially-inflected claims of constitutional shelter. It argues that the Court's use of this rhetoric reveals its adoption of a distinctly White-centered perspective, representing a one-sided view of racial reality that distorts the Court's ability to accurately appreciate the true nature of racial reality in contemporary America. This Article examines the Court's habit of using a White-centered perspective in constitutional race cases. Specifically, it looks at the Court's use of the rhetoric of White innocence in the context of the Court's concern with protecting "innocent" Whites in affirmative action cases. This Article concludes that the Court's insistence on choosing and imposing only one racialized perspective--the White-centered perspective--in racially-inflected constitutional claims is more than simply bad policy: that choice embodies an unconstitutional violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This Article calls for an appreciation of the dominant use and problematic character of the judicial imposition of an arbitrarily chosen racial perspective in deciding all constitutional race cases. It suggests a modification in judicial decisionmaking in which judges become conscious of the White-centeredness and arbitrariness and racial contingency of the White-centered vantage point. This Article urges a judicial appreciation of multiple levels of racial interpretation in an effort to loosen the hegemonic grip of the White-centered perspective and dilute its power on the mind and imagination of the judiciary. If this goal can be achieved, the White-centered perspective will become just one option among a multitude of equally-respected racial perspectives that can then fairly compete for both judicial recognition and legitimization.
