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Decline of Title VII Disparate Impact: The Role of the 1991 Civil Rights Act and the Ideologies of Federal Judges
This study employs various statistical techniques to test the efficacy of the 1991 Civil Rights Act in moderating the highly restrictive disparate impact regime imposed by Wards Cove, and to evaluate the hypothesis that political ideology should be a more powerful predictor of case outcomes following the 1991 Act. Part I of the paper describes the evolution of disparate impact doctrine from 1971 to the present. Part II analyzes data from randomly selected disparate impact cases brought by African American plaintiffs and finds that the current disparate impact doctrine emanating from the 1991 Civil Rights Act dramatically decreases the likelihood that such plaintiffs will successfully challenge facially-neutral employment practices. Two significant observations may be gleaned from Part II: first, that the ideologies of judges on the appellate panels deciding Title VII cases exert a far more significant impact on case outcomes in the post-1991 period; and, next, that one important explanation for the decline of successful disparate impact claims is that politically conservative judges decide a greater percentage of recent cases. Based on these findings, Part III argues that Congressional action to clarify disparate impact standards is essential to preserve Title VII as a conduit through which African Americans can seek redress for discrimination.Brennan Center For Justice Symposium Introduction: Diversity, Impartiality, and Representation on the Bench
As is evident from these articles, the question of judicial diversity is far more complex and nuanced than the current debate suggests. Many unanswered questions remain. The scholars in this issue and the others who presented their work at our convening have begun to reframe the debate and identify the hardest questions. We hope that this symposium issue will provoke further thought and provide a context for additional scholarship that will help us to answer those questions.Fair and Facially Neutral Higher Educational Admissions Through Disparate Impact Analysis
Part I of this Note proposes both remedial and instrumental justifications for applying disparate impact scrutiny to admissions policies. This Part argues that disparate impact analysis should be applied to higher education as a remedy for the disadvantage minority applicants face as a result of historic and ongoing intentional discrimination and that schools are culpable for unnecessarily utilizing admissions criteria that have this discriminatory effect. The result of applying disparate impact analysis will be admissions policies that produce diverse student bodies while remaining facially neutral with regard to race. Part II proposes that a necessity standard, unique to the higher education context, be fashioned such that admissions policies are made as equitable as possible while not undermining a school's ability to achieve its legitimate admissions goals. The proper necessity standard would grant schools latitude to define their institutional goals, but at the same time require that their admissions criteria be the least discriminatory methods of achieving these goals. Finally, Part III shows that a court can feasibly and effectively apply disparate impact analysis to admissions processes despite their complexity and variety.Does a Diverse Judiciary Attain a Rule of Law That is Inclusive?: What Grutter V. Bollinger Has To Say About Diversity on the Bench
This Article concludes that political dialogue engendered by controversial minority judicial nominations, like those of Miguel Estrada and Janice Rogers Brown, could be an avenue to educating the polity as to why it is important to achieve greater minority representation on the bench. The pluralistic process-based model of judging advocates that a critical mass of diverse judges be achieved, not that the minority judges be liberal rather than conservative, communitarian rather than individualist, or Democrat rather than Republican. The goal is that there be a critical mass of minority judges on benches that make decisions as a group, like circuit courts and supreme courts. This ideal is one towards which pluralist polities must strive.Toward an Understanding of Judicial Diversity in American Courts
Part I of this Article explores the utility of descriptive representation as an important concept in understanding why judicial diversity matters from a political perspective. Part II begins an empirical examination of judicial diversity at the federal level while Part III presents an analysis of state court diversity. The data presented in Parts II and III indicate that judges of color are underrepresented at all levels of the federal and state court systems and that particular racial and ethnic groups are virtually excluded from federal and state benches. The conclusion argues that the data presented in this Article support a disquieting portrait that erodes the myth of progress toward the attainment of a multiracial and multiethnic American judiciary.Abandoning the PIA Standard: A Comment on Gila V
Part I of this Note examines the development of Indian reserved water rights, and the practicably irrigable acreage method of quantifying those rights, as defined by the Court. Part II describes the arguments of state and private interests that oppose broad Indian water rights. Part III discusses Gila V, including the Arizona Supreme Court's rationale for abandoning the standard set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court and the standard for quantifying Indian reserved rights that the court applied in its place. Part IV analyzes the Arizona Supreme Court's justifications for abandoning the standard, and considers alternate grounds for the decision. Ultimately, this Note concludes that the Arizona Supreme Court misinterpreted precedent and wrongfully rejected the standard established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Arizona I and Arizona II. Thus, Gila V should be viewed as an abrogation of the established standard for defining Indian water rights and not serve as precedent.Conscious Use of Race as a Voluntary Means to Educational Ends in Elementary and Secondary Education: A Legal Argument Derived From Recent Judicial Decisions
This paper provides an in-depth examination of the ten recent court decisions concerning race-based student selection processes. As these cases will illustrate, school districts face increasing demands to justify any race-conscious selection process. The significance of meeting the demands and the implications for what appears to be an evolving legal theory is national in scope and broad in application. Some have even argued that some of these cases mark a departure away from the Court's thinking in Brown v. the Board of Education. It should also be noted that each of the cases mentioned above occurred in the context of some form of school choice, which heightens the significance of the research and the implications of its findings.Purchasing While Black: How Courts Condone Discrimination in the Marketplace
Given the sweeping language of § 1981 and 1982, it cannot be that sellers of goods can engage in intentional discrimination, so long as they make relatively minor attempts to cover it up. By exploring the interaction between substantive law, procedural law, legal culture, and real-world context, Graves seeks to demonstrate that judges cannot offer any legal or practical justification for heightened pleading requirements in § 1981 and 1982 actions. Through this argument, a conclusion is reached that § 1981 and 1982 plaintiffs must be given the same opportunity to litigate their claims that virtually all other plaintiffs are given. While this conclusion might seem basic, it is currently being ignored in many courtrooms across this country. The overwhelming majority of literature in the field makes the case against heightened pleading requirements by arguing that these requirements violate the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The impropriety of heightened pleading requirements under the Federal Rules, however, is not the final deduction in an argument against heightened pleading requirements; it is a starting point. Once we understand that heightened pleading requirements violate the Rules, we can ask why judges continue to impose them. We can, thus, attack the principles underlying judges' decisions to impose heightened pleading requirements.Protecting Native Americans: The Tribe as Parens Patriae
This Note argues that Tribes have parens patriae standing to protect their citizens through litigation on their behalf, even if not all of their citizens are engaged in the litigation. Part I examines the current requirements of parens patriae standing, as articulated by the Supreme Court. Part II briefly examines the nature of tribal sovereignty within American jurisprudence and concludes that parens patriae standing is a retained right of the Tribes. Part III examines the way in which the Federal District Courts have incorrectly handled tribal parens patriae standing. This section argues for a reexamination of Supreme Court doctrine when applying parens patriae standing to Tribes. Part IV briefly examines permissible defendants under Tribal parens patriae standing.Lowering the Preclearance Hurdle Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board, 120 S. Ct. 866 (2000)
This Case Note examines a recent Supreme Court decision that collapses the purpose and effect prongs of Section 5, effectively lowering the barrier to preclearance for covered jurisdictions. In Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board II the Court determined that Section 5 disallows only voting plans that are enacted with a retrogressive purpose (i.e., with the purpose to "worsen" the position of minority voters). The Court held that Section 5 does not prohibit preclearance of a plan enacted with a discriminatory purpose but without a retrogressive effect. Evidence of a Section 2 violation alone will not be enough to prove a jurisdiction's discriminatory purpose and prevent Section 5 preclearance.
