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  • Teaching Whren to White Kids

    This Article addresses issues at the intersection of United States v. Whren and Grutter v. Bollinger at a time when the reality of racial profiling was recently illustrated by the high-profile arrest of a prominent Harvard professor. Given the highly racialized nature of criminal procedure, there is a surprising dearth of writing about the unique problems of teaching issues such as racial profiling in racially homogeneous classrooms. Because African American and other minority students often experience the criminal justice system in radically different ways than do Whites, the lack of minority voices poses a significant barrier to effectively teaching criminal procedure. This Article critiques current law school pedagogical approaches and suggests that we must both re-think academic methods for teaching criminal procedure within the classroom and expose 'post-racial" mythologizing outside the classroom.

  • Affirmative Action & Negative Action: How Jian Li’s Case Can Benefit Asian Americans

    In October 2006, Asian American student Jian D filed a civil rights complaint against Princeton University claiming that Princeton's affirmative action policies were discriminatory. Li argues that affirmative action gives preferences to non-Asian minorities at the expense of Asian students. Li's case aligns the interests of Asian Americans with Whites who challenge affirmative action and suggests that such policies are inherently discriminatory because they exclude students based on race and sacrifice merit. This Article argues that Li's exclusion is not due to affirmative action but is likely due to "negative action," the unfavorable treatment of Asian Americans relative to Whites. Affirmative action is not discriminatory because it considers a multitude of factors, including race, to achieve a diverse student population. Nor does affirmative action sacrifice merit; rather, it redefines merit in a way that can benefit students of all racial groups. On the other hand, negative action is discriminatory and prevalent. Whether it takes the form of legacies, admission limits or racial group comparisons, negative action discriminates against Asian Americans based on their race and contributes to existing inequalities in admissions. Framing Li's case as a claim against negative action instead of affirmative action is a more accurate analysis that attacks ongoing discrimination in admissions, but preserves affirmative action's benefit for all racial groups.

  • From Proposition 209 to Proposal 2: Examining the Effects of Anti-Affirmative Action Voter Initiatives

    Transcript of the symposium held at the University of Michigan Law School on Saturday, February 9, 2008 in Hutchins Hall Room 100

  • From Pedagogical Sociology to Constitutional Adjudication: The Meaning of Desegregation in Social Science Research and Law

    In the United States following the case of Brown v. Board of Education (1954) federal judges with responsibility for public school desegregation but no expertise in education or schools management appointed experts from the social sciences to act as court advisors. In Boston, MA, educational sociologists helped Judge W. Arthur Garrity design a plan with educational enhancement at its heart, but the educational outcomes were marginalized by a desegregation jurisprudence conceptualized in terms of race rather than education. This Article explores the frustration of outcomes in Boston by reference to the differing conceptualizations of desegregation in law and social science. It argues that whereas social scientists see desegregation in terms of social change requiring integration, for lawyers desegregation is a remedy the content of which is shaped by the nature of the litigation. The imperatives of law and social science have in the past coincided in a jurisprudence of affirmative action but the recent school assignment cases demonstrate the extent to which they have now diverged. This divergence underlies the indeterminacy of the desegregation mandate and provides an analytical framework for a theory of the role of the court expert in schools desegregation.

  • (Still) Constitutional School De-Segregation Strategies: Teaching Racial Literacy to Secondary School Students and Preferencing Racially-Literate Applicants to Higher Education

    In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, the Supreme Court declared that it will continue to scrutinize race-conscious educational decisions to insure that they are narrowly-tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. This Article develops a strategy for enhancing racial diversity at all levels of American public education that can survive that rigorous constitutional scrutiny. The Article shows that school districts may prove that assigning a meaningful number of racially diverse students to their secondary schools is narrowly-tailored to achieve their compelling educational interest in teaching racial literacy. The constitutionality of this race-conscious educational strategy cannot be undermined by the availability of race-neutral student assignment plans; those race-neutral plans are not tailored to meet the precise educational objective of teaching racial literacy. This Article also demonstrates that an institution of higher learning that values racial literacy in its enrolled students may constitutionally prefer applicants who have a measurably strong foundation in racial literacy by virtue of having attended a racially-diverse secondary school. Those students would receive preferential admissions treatment not because of their race, but because of their acquisition of racial literacy. Accordingly, the compelling educational outcome of racial literacy can provide a constitutional foundation for enhancing racial diversity not only in secondary school, but in colleges and universities as well.

  • Without Color of Law: The Losing Race Against Colorblindness in Michigan

    This Essay examines affirmative action, while discussing its fall in California, Washington State, and ultimately Michigan.

  • Education and Labor Relations: Asian Americans and Blacks as Pawns in the Furtherance of White Hegemony

    Asian Americans and Blacks have been, and continue to be, racialized relative to each other in our society. Asian Americans and Blacks have come to occupy marginalized positions as the polarized ends on the economic spectrums of education and labor relations, with an expanding "Whiteness" as the filler in the middle as Whites manipulate the differing interests of both subordinated groups to align with White (the dominant group's) interests. Although Whites purport to champion the interests of one subordinate group over the other, in reality the racialization of Asian Americans and Blacks in our country is rooted in the preservation of White hegemony; this racialization is harmful to both subordinate groups and serves to reinforce White hegemony by exploiting areas of White privilege and domination, particularly in the context of education and labor relations. However, many mainstream theories and historical attempts to characterize the racialization of Asian Americans and Blacks (the theory of a monolithic form of racism that just happens to result in differing effects on Asian Americans and Blacks, the theory of a Black- White binary, the racial triangulation of Asian Americans against Whites and Blacks, and the "model minority" myth) fail to fully describe and capture the different positions within a multidimensional social hierarchy that Asian Americans and Blacks occupy. Therefore, we must look beyond these theories in order to fully understand race relations and the position of Asian Americans and Blacks in our society.

  • Can Michigan Universities Use Proxies for Race After the Ban on Racial Preferences?

    In 2003, the Supreme Court of the United States held that public universities—and the University of Michigan in particular--had a compelling reason to use race as one of many factors in their admissions processes: to reap the educational benefits of a racially diverse student body. In 2006, in response to the Supreme Court's decision, the people of Michigan approved a ballot proposal--called the Michigan Civil Rights Initiative ("MCRI")-that prohibits public universities in the state from discriminating or granting preferential treatment on the basis of race. Shortly after the MCRI was approved, a number of Michigan universities suggested that they were considering whether to use proxies for race in their admissions process in order to enroll racially diverse student bodies while circumventing the MCRI. These proxies include preferences for applicants who reside in heavily African American Detroit, applicants who are bilingual, and applicants who have lived on an Indian reservation. This Essay considers whether it is legal for the universities to use proxies for race like these in their admissions processes.

  • The Diversity Rationale: Unprovable, Uncompelling

    Student body diversity-and the purported educational benefits diversity bestows- is the final Supreme Court-endorsed justification for affirmative action by public universities. Are the benefits of diversity indeed "substantial," as the Grutter majority claimed? The author analyzes the social scientific research upon which the Court relied in articulating the diversity interest. By critiquing its theory and methodology, the author shows how the research fails to prove educational benefits; and by considering the logic underlying social science generally, he shows how the causal relationship is, technically, not provable. The author questions, then, how the diversity interest can possibly be compelling.

  • The Color of Perspective: Affirmative Action and the Constitutional Rhetoric of White Innocence

    This Article discusses the Supreme Court's use of the rhetoric of White innocence in deciding racially-inflected claims of constitutional shelter. It argues that the Court's use of this rhetoric reveals its adoption of a distinctly White-centered perspective, representing a one-sided view of racial reality that distorts the Court's ability to accurately appreciate the true nature of racial reality in contemporary America. This Article examines the Court's habit of using a White-centered perspective in constitutional race cases. Specifically, it looks at the Court's use of the rhetoric of White innocence in the context of the Court's concern with protecting "innocent" Whites in affirmative action cases. This Article concludes that the Court's insistence on choosing and imposing only one racialized perspective--the White-centered perspective--in racially-inflected constitutional claims is more than simply bad policy: that choice embodies an unconstitutional violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This Article calls for an appreciation of the dominant use and problematic character of the judicial imposition of an arbitrarily chosen racial perspective in deciding all constitutional race cases. It suggests a modification in judicial decisionmaking in which judges become conscious of the White-centeredness and arbitrariness and racial contingency of the White-centered vantage point. This Article urges a judicial appreciation of multiple levels of racial interpretation in an effort to loosen the hegemonic grip of the White-centered perspective and dilute its power on the mind and imagination of the judiciary. If this goal can be achieved, the White-centered perspective will become just one option among a multitude of equally-respected racial perspectives that can then fairly compete for both judicial recognition and legitimization.